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1. Prologue 
This article argues that the Kyoto Protocol1 to the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change2 was doomed to fail ab initio. It explains why this is the 
case by analyzing the Kyoto Protocol’s shortcomings and deficiencies. This article is 
divided into five parts. After the prologue in Part 1, Part 2 is devoted to the main legal, 
structural, and policy responses to climate change by providing an analysis of most 
Conferences of the Parties (COPs).3 The Kyoto Protocol is analyzed in Part 3. Part 4 
analyzes the position of the three main players in climate change: the U.S., China, and the 
European Union (EU). Part 5 provides some recommendations for the future. 
 
2. Legal and Policy Responses to Climate Change 
The global warming issue has been visible in the international agenda for some time. The 
first years were spent simply corroborating that climate change was a real and serious 
issue, and yet nations did not consider the need to be legally bound by international 
treaties in order to solve the problem. With time, there was a clear agreement among the 
international community that, unless nations were legally bound, there would be no 
                                                 
1 Kyoto Protocol, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/add.1, 10 December 1997, reprinted in (1998) 37 ILM 22. Currently, 
there are 193 Parties (192 States and 1 regional economic integration organization) to the Kyoto Protocol to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 
2 UNFCCC, 9 May 1992, 31 ILM 849. Currently, there are 195 Parties (194 States and 1 regional economic 
integration organization) to the UNFCCC. See 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php. 
3 The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the supreme body of the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. It comprises all the 170-plus states that have ratified the Convention. It held its first session (COP-
1) in Berlin in 1995 and meets on a yearly basis unless the Parties decide otherwise. The COP’s role is to 
promote and review the implementation of the Convention. It periodically reviews existing commitments in 
light of the Convention’s objective, new scientific findings, and the effectiveness of national climate 
change programs. The COP can adopt new commitments through amendments and protocols. In December 
1997, at its third session (COP-3), it adopted the Kyoto Protocol, containing stronger emissions-related 
commitments for developed countries in the post-2000 period. 
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progress in addressing global warming. In the early 1990s, most countries joined an 
international treaty—the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—to 
consider what could be done to reduce global warming, and how to cope with inevitable 
temperature increases. Years later, a number of nations approved an addition to the 
UNFCCC, i.e., the Kyoto Protocol, which has more powerful (and legally binding) 
measures.4 In the following subsections, we shall briefly examine the legal evolution of 
several partial climate change agreements. 
                                                 
4 For a non-exhaustive list of publications regarding international agreements on climate change, see 
Ackerly, B. & Vandenbergh, M. “Climate Change Justice: The Challenge for Global Governance,” 20 Geo. 
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev., 553 (2008); Aldy, J. & Stavins, R. Post-Kyoto International Climate Policy: Summary 
for Policymakers, Research from the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009; Aldy, J. & Stavins, Robert N. (eds.), Architecture for Agreement: Addressing 
Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World, Cambridge University Press, 2007; Bessendorf, A. 
“Games in the Hothouse: Theoretical Dimensions in Climate Change,” 28 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev., 325 
(2005); Bodansky, D. “Beyond Kyoto: Dilemmas of Climate Regulation and Equity,” 102 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 
Proceedings, 23 (2008); Bodansky, D. “The Future of Climate Governance: Creating a More Flexible 
Architecture,” in Stewart, R. et al. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate 
Change and Global Development, NYU Press, 2009; Burns, W. “Belt & Suspenders? The World Heritage 
Convention's Role in Confronting Climate Change,” 17 S.E. Envtl. L.J., 481 (2009); Carraro, C. (ed.), 
International Environmental Agreements on Climate Change, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999; 
Dernbach, J. “Achieving Early and Substantial Greenhouse Gas Reductions Under a Post-Kyoto 
Agreement,” 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 573 (2008); Docherty, B. & Giannini, T. “Confronting a Rising 
Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees,” 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., 349 (2009); 
Dodds, F., et al. (eds.), Climate Change and Energy Insecurity: The Challenge for Peace, Security and 
Devleopment, Earthscan, 2009; El-Ashry, M. “An Overview of This Issue: Framework for a Post-Kyoto 
Climate Change Agreement,” 8(2) Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y, 2 (2008); Gainza-Carmenates, R., et al., 
“Stakeholder-based Scenarios for Post-2012 Climate Policy: A Participatory Approach,” 3 Carbon & 
Climate L. Rev., 248 (2009); Green, B. “Lessons From The Montreal Protocol: Guidance For The Next 
International Climate Change Agreement,” 39 Envtl. L., 253 (2009); Halvorssen, A. “UNFCCC, The Kyoto 
Protocol, and The WTO -- Brewing Conflicts Or Are They Mutually Supportive?” 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol'y, 369 (2008); Heller, T. “Afterword: Reflections on a Path to Effective Climate Change Mitigation” in 
Stewart, R. et al. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and 
Global Development, NYU Press, 2009; Hill, R. “The International Climate Change 
Agreement: An Evolution,” 24 U. New South Wales L.J., 543 (2001); Höhne, N. et al., “Climate Change 
Legislation And Initiatives At International Level And Design Options For Future International Climate 
Policy,” Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy (2007); Jamieson, D. “The Post-Kyoto Climate: 
A Gloomy Forecast,” 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 537 (2008); Kaniaru, D. et al., “Landmark Agreement to 
Strengthen Montreal Protocol Provides Powerful Climate Mitigation,” 8(2) Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y, 46 
(2008); Long, A. “International Consensus and U.S. Climate Change Litigation,” 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. 
& Pol'y Rev., 177 (2008); Malone, E. Debating Climate Change: Pathways through Argument to 
Agreement, Earthscan, 2009; McNeely, J. “Applying the Diversity of International Conventions to Address 
the Challenges of Climate Change,” 17 Mich. St. J. Int'l L., 123 (2008); Morgenstern, L. “One, Two or One 
and a Half Protocols? An Assessment of Suggested Options for the Legal Form of the Post-2012 Climate 
Regime,” 3 Carbon & Climate L. Rev., 235 (2009); Mumma, A. & Hodas, D. “Designing a Global Post-
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2.1. Earth Summit: Rio de Janeiro and the UNFCCC (1992) 
Twenty years after the 1972 Stockholm Declaration first laid the foundations of 
contemporary environmental policy, the Earth Summit became the largest-ever gathering 
of Heads of State. One of the documents resulting from the Earth Summit was the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC is the 
centerpiece of global efforts to combat global warming and sets general objectives, goals, 
and arrangements for cooperation in addressing climate change. As concern about climate 
change has grown, the UNFCCC has provided a forum for negotiating a more intensive 
and detailed international agreement for, inter alia, the limitation of GHG emissions. 
Over 150 countries signed the UNFCCC in 1992. Because of the refusal of the U.S. to 
accept a target, the final text of the UNFCCC did not specify precise targets for any 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that Advances Human Development,” 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 619 
(2008); Petsonk, A. “'Docking Stations:' Designing a More Welcoming Architecture for a Post 2012 
Framework to Combat Climate Change,” 19 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., 433 (2009); Rajamani, L. 
“Addressing the 'Post-Kyoto' Stress Disorder: Reflections on the Emerging Legal Architecture of the 
Climate Regime,” 58 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 803 (2009); Rajamani, L. “From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: 
Killing Kyoto Softly?” 57 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 909 (2008); Rehak, S. “Climate Change and the Copenhagen 
Consensus 2004: A Critical Review of Economic Prioritization,” 2005 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, 41; 
Roberts, M. “The Montreal Protocol Must Act to Prevent Global Climate Change While Restoring the 
Ozone Layer,” 9(3) Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y, 33 (2009); Roberts, M. & Grabiel, P. “A Window of 
Opportunity: Combating Climate Change by Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate the Production 
and Consumption of HFCs and ODS Banks,” 22 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 99 (2009); Schatz, A. 
“Foreword: Beyond Kyoto - The Developing World and Climate Change,” 20 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 531 
(2008); Schwarze, R. Law and Economics of International Climate Change Policy, Dordrecht 2001; Smyth, 
S. “The Prototype Carbon Fund: A New Departure in International Trusts and Securities Law,” 5(2) 
Sustainable Development L. & Pol'y, 28 (2005); Sussman, E. “The Energy Charter Treaty’s Investor 
Protection Provisions: Potential to Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote Sustainable 
Development, 14 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L., 391 (2008); Winter, G. Multilevel Governance of Global 
Environmental Change: An Interdisciplinary Approach, Cambridge University Press 2006; Zedillo P. 
Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto, Brookings Institution Press 2008. 
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country.5 Industrialized nations agreed to voluntary caps on emissions of man-made 
GHG. It entered into force on 21 March 1994.6 
Although the U.S. and most other industrialized countries failed to meet their 
voluntary goals (i.e., returning emissions to 1990 levels by year 2000, as embodied in 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC), and notwithstanding the fact that no U.S. administration has 
done much to implement the UNFCCC’s provisions, the Convention provides not only a 
long-term view, but also much of the mechanics such as emissions monitoring and 
reporting, that will be needed to implement any future obligations. Most importantly, the 
Convention provides for an ongoing process of negotiation, review of new scientific 
information, and discussion and collaboration by countries on the climate change issue.   
The Convention’s ultimate objective is the 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic (man-made) interference with the climate system. 
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure 
that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”7 
 
The chart below shows the exponential rise in CO2 atmospheric concentration in the past 
few decades.8 
                                                 
5 Bodansky, D. “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary,” Yale 
Journal of International Law, 18: 451-558, 1993. 
6 According to Article 24 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty enters into force 
for those states which gave the required consent. A treaty may also provide that, upon certain conditions 
having been met, it shall come into force provisionally. 
7 Article 2 of the UNFCCC (1992). For an analysis of Article 2 of the UNFCCC, see Oppenheimer, M. & 
Petsonk, A. “Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations,” Climatic Change, Vol. 
73, pp. 195-226, 2005. 
8 On the reasons for concern regarding climate change, see the analysis by Joel Smith et al. “Assessing 
dangerous climate change through an update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
‘reasons for concern’,” PNAS, Vol. 106, No. 11, 17 March 2009, pp. 4133-4137; see also O’Neill, B. & 
Oppenheimer, M. “Dangerous Climate Impacts and the Kyoto Protocol,” Science, Vol. 296, pp. 1971-1972, 
June 2002. 
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 The major guidelines of the Convention are as follows: 
a.- The Convention sets out some guiding principles. The Convention speaks of 
“precautionary measures,”9 meaning that the lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as an excuse to postpone action when there is a threat of serious or irreversible 
damage. The principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”10 of states assigns 
the lead in combating climate change to developed countries. Other principles deal with 
                                                 
9 Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC (1992). 
10 Articles 3.1 and 4.1 of the UNFCCC (1992). 
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the special needs of developing countries and the importance of promoting sustainable 
development.11 
b.- Both developed and developing countries accept a number of general commitments.12 
All Parties will develop and submit “national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol,13 using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the 
Parties.”14 According to Article 4.1(c) and (d) of the UNFCCC, the Parties will also 
promote technology transfer15 and sustainable management, conservation and 
enhancement of sinks16 and reservoirs.17 In addition, the Parties shall “take climate 
change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, 
economic and environmental policies and actions”18 as well as “cooperate in scientific, 
technological, technical, socio-economic and other research […] related to the climate 
system.”19 They will also promote and cooperate in education, public awareness, and 
exchange of information related to climate change.20 
                                                 
11 On this point, see generally the report by the United Nations Environment Program, “Towards a Green 
Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication,” 2011. 
12 Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC (1992) contains general commitments for all Parties, developing and 
developed. 
13 (footnote not in the original quotation) The 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer came was created as a result of the recognition that “world-wide emissions of certain 
substances can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to 
result in adverse effects on human health and the environment.” See the Preamble of the Montreal Protocol. 
14 Article 4.1(a) of the UNFCCC (1992). 
15 Article 4.1(c ) of the UNFCCC (1992). 
16 Article 1.8 of the UNFCCC defines sinks as “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.” 
17 Article 1.7 (d) of the UNFCCC defines reservoir as “a component or components of the climate system 
where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.” 
18 Article 4.1(f) of the UNFCCC (1992). 
19 Article 4.1(g) of the UNFCCC (1992). 
20 Article 4.1(i) of the UNFCCC (1992). 
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c.- Industrialized countries also undertake several specific commitments.21 Most 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)22 and 
the States of Central and Eastern Europe—known collectively as Annex I countries, i.e., 
those countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC—committed to adopting policies and 
measures aimed at returning their GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
Countries must decide what policies and measures to adopt in order to achieve their 
emissions targets.23 Some possible policies and measures which Parties could implement 
are listed in the Kyoto Protocol and could offer opportunities for intergovernmental 
cooperation.24 OECD countries should take the strongest measures, while the countries in 
transition to a market economy are granted a certain degree of flexibility. 
d.- The richest countries shall provide new additional financial resources and facilitate 
technology transfer. The Annex II countries of the UNFCCC (essentially OECD 
countries) will fund the agreed full cost incurred by developing countries for submitting 
their national communications. The Convention recognizes that the extent to which 
developing countries implement their commitments will depend on financial and 
technical assistance from developed countries. 
                                                 
21 Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC (1992) contains specific commitments for developed country (Annex I) 
Parties only, notably to take measures aimed at returning greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000. 
22 The OECD groups 30 member countries sharing a commitment to democratic government and market 
economy in a unique forum to discuss, develop, and refine economic and social policies. They compare 
experiences, seek answers to common problems, and work to co-ordinate domestic and international 
policies to help members and non-members deal with an increasingly globalized world. Their exchanges 
may lead to agreements to act in a formal way, for example by establishing legally binding agreements to 
crack down on bribery, or codes for free flow of capital and services. Together, they produce around two-
thirds of the world’s goods and services. 
23 See Article 4.2 (b) of the UNFCCC (1992), which reads: “In order to promote progress to this end, each 
of these Parties shall communicate […] detailed information on its policies and measures” on the mitigation 
of climate change. 
24 Article 2.1(a) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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e.- The establishment of institutional structures and a system of establishing and 
amending Protocols and Annexes are an important element of the Convention. This is 
perhaps the most important part of the Convention. There will be a system of periodic 
Conferences of the Parties so that as more becomes known about climate change, 
additional commitments can be made through a structural disciplined iterative process. 
That is why it is a “Framework” Convention. 
 
2.2. COP-1: Berlin (1995) 
As is the case in many international treaties, the UNFCCC started a process that included 
annual meetings called Conferences of the Parties (COPs). The first of these was held in 
Berlin in 1995, where the parties agreed that the industrialized parties should set emission 
limits within specified time-frames such as 2005, 2010, 2020, and that these should be 
incorporated in a protocol, to be signed possibly by the end of 1997. This is where the 
idea of the Kyoto Protocol was given birth. So the COP-1 produced the Berlin Mandate, 
which provided the ground rules for the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
2.3. COP-2: Geneva (1996) 
For the first time, it was officially announced that there is a human influence on the 
global climate. Before the 1996 COP-2 in Geneva, there was some controversy as to 
whether climate change resulted from human activity. 
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2.4. COP-3: Kyoto and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
At the December 1997 COP-3, the 159 participating nations adopted by consensus the 
Kyoto Protocol,25 which was a step further from previous international environmental 
agreements on climate change because it contained stronger emissions commitments for 
developed countries in the post-2000 period.26 The Kyoto Protocol was stronger in two 
senses: 1) being legally binding, which was necessary, and 2) being more ambitious in 
aiming for real reduction from 1990 emissions levels, as opposed to merely reaching the 
1990 levels. 
Regarding the second point, by adopting the Protocol, the parties recognized the 
importance of expanding the scope of the UNFCCC. The Parties also recognized that 
more ambitious steps than the UNFCCC commitments to stabilize GHG emissions were 
required to address climate change. This point may be the conventional way to look at the 
Protocol but, by doing that, it does an injustice to the UNFCCC, which after all was 
established as a Framework to initiate a process that was expected to lend to Kyoto-type 
environmental agreements. From that perspective, Kyoto may have been a 
disappointingly unambitious step. By arresting and reversing the upward trend in GHG 
emissions that started 150 years ago, the Protocol promised to move the international 
community one step closer to achieving the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective of preventing 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”27 
                                                 
25 Adoption is the formal act by which the form and content of a proposed treaty text are established. As a 
general rule, the adoption of the text of a treaty takes place through the expression of the consent of the 
States participating in the treaty-making process. See Article 9 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. 
26 Bothe, M. “The Kyoto Protocol as a Pioneer Among the Multilateral Environmental Agreements,” in 
Douma, W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal and Policy 
Challenges of Climate Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 241-246.  
27 Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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Kyoto marked the first international environmental negotiation to receive 
widespread attention since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. The diverging 
positions of the key parties to the negotiation—the European Union, the United States, 
and the G-7728—seemed too distant for any meaningful agreement to be reached. Almost 
the entire text of the Kyoto Protocol was heavily bracketed, often with more than two 
alternative provisions elaborated. Failure to reach an agreement would be deemed an 
embarrassing failure to many governments. Obviously, no one wanted to be accused of 
having killed Kyoto. The then U.S. Vice President Al Gore agreed to attend the 
conference and publicly instructed the U.S. delegation to be flexible during the 
negotiation in order to reach an agreement. Within a few days, the United States 
announced that it would consider flexible targets and timetables. This meant that 
industrialized nations did not have to agree to the same emission reductions and the same 
baseline year.29  
Based on these grounds, Japan immediately tabled a new proposal which had the 
EU reducing emissions more than either the U.S. or Japan. The EU reacted to the 
Japanese proposal by insisting on being able to use the EU Kyoto “bubble”30 by which it 
could meet the emission reductions through a system of trading among its Member 
States, in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S.—which disagreed 
                                                 
28 “The Group of 77 is the largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the United 
Nations, which provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective 
economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues 
within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development.” See The Group 
of 77 at the United Nations, http://www.g77.org/doc/. 
29 See Hunter, D., Salzman, J. & Zaelke, D. International Environmental Law and Policy, Foundation 
Press, 1998, pp. 649-50. 
30 The Kyoto Protocol has changed the context of global warming policies by prescribing legally binding 
GHG emissions reduction targets to countries listed in its Annex B. The EU has a commitment to reduce its 
overall emissions by 8 per cent, but Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol (usually referred as the “EU bubble”) 
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with the “bubble” concept because it enabled EU nations to act as a bloc in emission 
reduction to meet their targets—said that it was considering creating a GHG trading 
regime including Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. (the so-called 
JUSCANZ countries).31 
The Kyoto Protocol was criticized (even before it was completed) for its 
exclusion of mandatory GHG emissions limitation requirements for developing countries, 
even those with large GHG emission inventories like China, India, and Brazil. From a 
U.S. perspective, the structure of the negotiation problem looks remarkably similar today 
to how it looked during the COP-3. 
 
2.5. COP-6: The Hague (2000) 
The conference at The Hague broke down because the draft treaty tried to do too much 
too fast. There were too many brackets to be worked on when politicians came to The 
Hague. In the end, there was not enough time to resolve the issues contained in the 
brackets and texts which remained on the table.32 
Four main issues were negotiated at The Hague. The first one concerned the 
transfer of clean technologies to developing countries and the provision of aid to help 
developing countries adapt to climate change and develop the capacity to track their own 
emissions. Developing countries wanted to know how much money would be provided 
and how it would be allocated. 
                                                                                                                                                 
allows the EU and its Member States to fulfill their commitments jointly, through differentiated 
commitments for Member States. 
31 Hunter, D., Salzman, J. & Zaelke, D. International Environmental Law and Policy, Foundation Press, 
1998, p. 650.  
32 Grubb, M. & Yamin, F. “Climatic Collapse at The Hague: What Happened, Why, and Where do We Go 
from Here? International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2, 2001, pp. 261-276. 
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The second main issue was regarding sinks. During the negotiations, there was 
hope for agreement until, at the last moment, a compromise on “sinks” fell apart. The 
primary question was how much credit a country should get for its land use and forestry 
practices. The U.S. argued that it would need rules giving it wide access to credits for its 
sinks in order to meet the large reductions from business-as-usual emissions trends that 
Kyoto would impose. On the other hand, the Europeans denounced the American 
proposal as a major loophole that would undercut the integrity of the whole Kyoto 
regime.33 
 The third main issue at The Hague was the so-called Kyoto mechanisms (clean 
development mechanism, the trading of emissions permits, and joint implementation), all 
of which will be analyzed later. Although a number of fundamental policy questions 
remained unanswered, some progress was made in developing the technical procedures 
for these mechanisms. 
The fourth main point had to do with compliance (how to measure and how to 
enforce the Kyoto Protocol), which will also be analyzed later. The Hague unfortunately 
gave no clear answers. Since the Kyoto text makes no provision for enforcement, this still 
remains one of the major legal deficiencies of the text.34 
 
                                                 
33 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 12. 
34 Ibid., pp. 11-13, at 12-13. 
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2.6. COP-13: Bali (2007) 
The Bali Conference legally obliged all parties to work for a new global climate change 
treaty. The outcome of the Bali Conference was the adoption of the Bali Action Plan,35 
which is a two-track process in which negotiators meet in two ad hoc working groups. 
The first one is the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA), with a mandate to focus on key elements of long-term 
cooperation identified during the Convention Dialogue: mitigation, adaptation, climate 
finance (i.e., transfers of public and private funds from developed to developing countries 
for the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change),36 capacity building, and 
technology transfer.37 This group includes all parties to the UNFCCC. The second is the 
Ad Hoc Working Group for Further Commitments for Annex 1 Countries under the 
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), and includes only those parties that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol.38 
Maintaining this division was crucial for developing countries, because under the 
Kyoto Protocol developed countries (Annex 1) are legally bound to reduce emissions, 
                                                 
35 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_ 13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf. 
36 On climate finance, see Stewart, R., Kingsbury, B. and Rudyk, B. “Climate Finance: Key Concepts and 
Ways Forward,” Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Viewpoints, December 2009, 
available at http://www.iilj.org/climatefinance/documents/CF-KeyConcepts.pdf; Ballesteros, A., 
Nakhooda, S., Werksman, J. and Hurlburt, K, “Power, responsibility and accountability: re-thinking the 
legitimacy of institutions for climate finance” Washington, D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2010, 
available at http://pdf.wri.org/power_responsibility_accountability.pdf. 
37 See generally Rajamani, L. “From Berlin to Bali and Beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly?” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 57, pp. 909-939, October 2008 (tracing the evolution of the climate 
regime and analyzing the language of the Bali Action Plan in support of the argument that the Bali Action 
Plan provides Parties the option of killing Kyoto softly). 
38 On the Bali Action Pan, see generally Christoff, P. “The Bali Roadmap: Climate Change, COP 13 and 
Beyond,” 17(3) Environmental Politics, pp. 466-472, 2008; Clemencon, R. “The Bali Road Map: A First 
Step on the Difficult Journey to a Post-Kyoto Protocol Agreement,” 17 The Journal of Environment & 
Development, pp. 70-94, 2008; Mace, M.J. “The Bali Road Map: Can it Deliver an Equitable Post-2012 
Climate Agreement for Small Island States?,” 17(2) Rev. Eur. Comm. & Int’l Envtl. L. 183 (2008); Ott, H. 
et al., “The Bali Roadmap: new horizons for global climate policy,” 8 Climate Policy, pp. 91-95 (2008); 
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whereas developing countries’ reductions are voluntary. However, some developed 
countries, especially the U.S., found this approach unacceptable. In their view, a new 
climate change treaty should be a single treaty committing both developed and 
developing countries to reducing emissions, accepting the fact that developed countries 
must lead in the reductions, but also that some developing countries such as China, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa are today among the largest emitters of CO2 and therefore 
should not have the same level of obligations as the world’s poorest countries.39 
 
2.7. COP-15: Copenhagen and the Copenhagen Accord (2009) 
Climate change is the result of the largest market failure the world has ever seen: the 
prices of goods and services do not reflect the true costs associated with the impacts of 
GHG emissions that would result from climate change. Future effective policies must 
address market failures by creating a price on emissions (in other words, a carbon price), 
which can be created through a carbon tax40 or through a cap-and-trade system.41 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Carpenter, C. “The Bali Action Plan: Key Issues in the Climate Negotiations,” in United Nations 
Development Program, The Bali Road Map: Key Issues under Negotiation, pp. 5-21 (2008). 
39 Meilstrup, P. “The Runaway Summit: The Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the 
UN Climate Change Conference,” Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook, 2010, pp. 113-135, at 122, available 
at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2010/YB2010/YB2010-Runaway-summit_WEB.pdf. 
40 Cooper, R. “Toward a Real Treaty on Global Warming,” Foreign Affairs 77: 66-79, 1998; Cooper, R. 
“The Kyoto Protocol: A Flowed Concept,” Environmental Law Reporter 31: 11,484-11,492, 2001; 
Nordhaus, W. “After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming,” paper prepared for a 
joint session of the American Economic Association and Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economists, 2001; Nordhaus, W. “Is the Kyoto Protocol a Dead Duck? Are There Any Live Ducks 
Around? Comparison of Alternative Global Tradable Emissions Regimes,” revised from the NBER/Yale 
Workshop version of August 1997, 1998. 
41 “Under cap and trade schemes, governments or intergovernmental bodies set an overall legal limit on 
emissions in a certain time period (“a cap”) and then grant industries a certain number of licenses to pollute 
(“carbon permits” or “emissions allowances”). Companies that do not meet their cap can buy permits from 
others that have a surplus (“a trade”). The cap is supposed to reduce emissions over time. However, setting 
a limit on pollution can be highly susceptible to corporate lobbying and favoritism, to such an extent that 
companies can frequently continue to increase pollution while remaining within the cap.” See Carbon 
Trade Watch, December 2009, available at 
http://www.carbontradewatch.org/downloads/publications/factsheet01-cap_and_trade.pdf. 
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COP-15 clearly failed in at least on respect: it ended with the hastily negotiated 
Copenhagen Accord42 which was unable to gain the support of the COP and thus 
amounted only to a series of political commitments by States, rather than the sought‐after 
binding obligations. In particular, it failed to produce legally binding commitments by 
major emitting nations to additional or new emissions limitations. It is widely understood 
that one of the key reasons why the COP-15 failed to produce legally binding obligations 
was the inability of the U.S. to commit in an international agreement to a target for 
limiting emissions because of the U.S. administration’s failure to secure passage of 
climate regulatory legislation. In other words, the current machinery is insufficient for the 
needs of resolving the climate change issue. 
 The international community, however, agreed in the Copenhagen Accord that 
“[T]o achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention [on Climate Change] to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, 
recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be 
below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable 
development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate 
change.”43 
 
Moreover, the Accord did make progress on some important issues and set the 
agenda for further negotiations throughout 2010. The Copenhagen Accord, put forward 
by Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and the U.S., provided a platform for building a 
necessary international climate change agreement. More than 100 countries have 
associated themselves with the Accord. Countries that have made pledges of action are 
                                                 
42 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, 18 December 2009. 
43 Ibid., para. 1. 
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responsible for more than 80 per cent of current annual emissions of GHG.44 The 
Accord’s key features are as follows: 
 Under the Copenhagen Accord, nations pledged not only to finance mitigation 
and adaptation efforts for developing countries, but also to keep global temperatures from 
rising more than 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit)45 from pre-industrial levels;46 
 The Accord recognizes that developing countries will require significant support 
from developed nations to help them with the transition to low-carbon growth. In this 
sense, the Accord committed developed countries to “a goal of mobilizing jointly 
US$100 billion a year by 2020.”47 However, recognizing that developed countries would 
find it difficult to provide additional money from current public funds, a high-level 
advisory group on climate change financing established by the UN Secretary-General 
looked at various sources of climate financing in developing countries, such as taxes on, 
or trading schemes for, international aviation and shipping, raising public funds via the 
international and domestic auctions of emission allowances, making use of the 
International Monetary Fund’s special drawing rights, as well as stimulating private 
capital flows through scaled up market mechanisms, and innovative financial instruments 
                                                 
44 For analyses of the Copenhagen Conference, see Doelle, M, “The Legacy of Climate Talks in 
Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or Brokenhagen?” 1 Carbon & Climate L. Rev., 86 (2010); Ekardt, F.  et al., 
“Climate Change, Justice, and Clean Development – A Review of the Copenhagen Negotiating Draft,” 3 
Carbon & Climate L. Rev., 261 (2009); Hines, R. “Looking To The UN Climate Change Convention In 
Copenhagen: Upcoming Developments In The Climate Change Policy Arena,” and Saines, R. “Changing 
Developments in Climate Change Law: Looking Ahead To Copenhagen And Beyond,” in The Impact of 
International Climate Change Policies: Leading Lawyers On Counseling Clients, Navigating Recent and 
Upcoming Developments, and Recognizing The Economic Impact of Climate Change Policy, Aspatore 
Books, 2009. 
45 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 2. 
46 For an analysis of what happened at the COP-15, see Meilstrup, P. “The Runaway Summit: The 
Background Story of the Danish Presidency of COP15, the UN Climate Change Conference,” Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook, 2010, pp. 113-135, available at 
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2010/YB2010/YB2010-Runaway-summit_WEB.pdf. 
47 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 8. 
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that seek to improve the risk-return ratio associated with green investment in developing 
countries.48 One example of the latter is Deutsche Bank’s proposed GET FiT program,49 
which would use a fund of public monies contributed by developed countries to address 
project development and financing barriers and, thereby catalyze greater supply of (and 
demand for) private sector financing for renewable energy projects in low- and middle-
income countries. In particular, the fund would support the development of domestic 
policies aimed at mitigating risk and creating incentives for investment for investing in 
renewable energy, such as the use of feed-in tariffs and power purchase agreements. 
 The Accord called for both developed and developing countries to submit 
individual emissions-reduction goals or action plans. The Copenhagen Accord, however, 
failed to produce an adequate and legally binding action plan for achieving long-term 
reductions in GHG emissions for 2020 and 2050.50 The absence of binding targets under 
the Kyoto Protocol for most of the world’s largest emitters, including China (which has 
surpassed the U.S as the largest emitter of CO2 in the world), the U.S., Indonesia, India, 
and Brazil, has undermined both the environmental effectiveness and broader legitimacy 
of the Kyoto Protocol regime; 
                                                 
48 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing, 5 
November 2010, available at 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/AGF%20Report.pdf. 
49 Deutsche Bank Group, “GET FiT Program: Global Energy Transfer Feed-in Tariffs for Developing 
Countries,” April 2010, available at http://www.dbadvisors.com/content/_media/GET_FIT_-
_042610_FINAL.pdf. 
50 For an assessment of the Copenhagen Accord, see Houser, T. “Copenhagen, the Accord, and the Way 
Forward,” Policy Brief, No. 10-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2010. 
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 The Accord provides for a system of pledge and review, whereby developed 
countries would set their own, non‐binding targets for reducing GHG emissions and 
would communicate these to the UNFCCC Secretariat;51 
 The Accord provides for developing countries to formulate programs of 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)52 (that is, projects and policies 
formulated domestically with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions) also to be 
communicated to the UNFCCC secretariat.53 
 The Accord commits developed countries to provide US$30 billion in fast‐start 
climate finance to developing countries over the period 2010 to 2012. Priority in the 
funding was pledged to Africa, least-developed countries, and small island nations;54 
Climate finance, therefore, emerged as a key pillar of the climate change negotiations.55 
 The Accord requires the measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV)56 of 
both emissions reductions achieved and climate finance provided by developed to 
developing countries;57 
 The Accord recognizes the crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries, and the need to provide positive 
                                                 
51 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 4. 
52 For a list of the specific commitments made, see Dalkmann, H. & Binsted, A. “Copenhagen Accord 
NAMA Submissions,” February 2010, available at 
http://www.transport2012.org/bridging/ressources/files/1/586,NAMA-submissions_080210_final.pdf. 
53 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 5. 
54 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 8. 
55 On the link between international law and climate finance, see Mason-Case, S. & Cordonier Segger, M.-
C., “International Law and Climate Finance,” The Center for International Sustainable Development Law 
& The International Development Law Organization, December 2010. 
56 For further detail on the MRV, see Pew Center on Global Climate Change, “MRV: A Survey of 
Reporting and Review in Multilateral Regimes,” December 2010, available at 
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/survey-reporting-review-multilateral-regimes.pdf; also, Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, “Strengthening MRV: Measurement, Reporting and Verification,” 
December 2010, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/strengthening-mrv.pdf. 
57 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 5. 
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incentives through the establishment of carbon trading58 and other financing mechanisms, 
including Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation‐plus, to 
mobilize financial resources from developed countries.59 
In the end, the negotiations boiled down to two main groups with clear positions. 
The first group was composed of developing countries (represented by China, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa), arguing that developed countries are responsible for most of 
the global damage resulting from climate change. The second group, comprised 
developed countries (represented by three main EU countries—i.e., Germany, France, 
and the UK, the position of all of whom was concrete figures on CO2 reduction—and the 
U.S.), demanded developing countries to commit to greater GHG reduction if they 
wanted citizens from developed countries to make the necessary economic sacrifice to 
tackle climate change.60 In this sense, China accepted the need to grow with less carbon 
intensity and is investing in energy efficiency and existing low-carbon technology. The 
United States committed to reducing its emissions by 17 per cent by 2020. The U.S. 
federal government will have great difficulty achieving that target without action at the 
state level, particularly so long as Congress is unwilling to pass a comprehensive climate 
                                                 
58 See for instance Howse, R. & Eliason, A. “Carbon Trading and the CDM in WTO Law,” in Stewart, R., 
Kingsbury, B. and Rudyk, B. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate 
Change and Global Development, NYU Press, 2009, pp. 254-258; Freestone, D. and Streck, C. (eds.), 
Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009. 
59 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, para. 6. 
60 To listen to the actual climate negotiations among the main world leaders in Copenhagen in December 
2009, see Spiegel Online, “How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit,” available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861-2,00.html. 
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and energy bill. It is interesting to note that embassy dispatches show that the U.S. used 
spying, threats, and promises of aid to get support for the Copenhagen Accord.61 
 
2.8. COP-16: Cancún (2010) 
2.8.1. An Overview 
The Cancún Conference of the Parties surpassed the low expectations when governments 
struck a deal that keeps alive efforts for a multilateral response to tackle climate change.62 
Governments agreed on an international system for monitoring mitigation, fleshed out a 
facility for climate finance,63 and established rules for rewarding forest preservation. 
However, trade issues (such as emissions resulting from the international shipment of 
goods, the use of unilateral trade measures ostensibly to offset reduced industrial 
competitiveness resulting from higher carbon costs), proved too contentious, and were 
left out of the text. Additionally, any references to the use of unilateral trade measures 
were removed, leaving a crucial element of enforcement and regulation unresolved. 
                                                 
61 Carrington, D. “WikiLeaks Cables Reveal how US Manipulated Climate Accord,” The Guardian, 4 
December 2010, p. 6, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-us-
manipulated-climate-accord. 
62 See generally http://unfccc.int/2860.php; for specific deals agreed in Cancún, see UNFCCC, Outcome of 
the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Draft 
Decision -/CP.16 (2010), available at  
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf; also, UNFCCC, Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
at its Fifteenth Session, Draft Decision -/CMP.6 (2010), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/ pdf/cop16_kp.pdf. 
63 See 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/conference_documents/application/pdf/20101204_cop16_fm.pdf. 
See also Pew Center on Global Climate Change, “Strengthening International Climate Finance,” December 
2010, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/strengthening-international-climate-finance.pdf. 
On climate finance, Daniel Firger argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, while some climate-
friendly regulations may indeed be prima facie incompatible with the obligations imposed on states by 
typical international investment agreements, many climate policies—especially those related to climate 
finance and technology transfer—involve principles common to foreign investment law and are largely 
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Moreover, governments’ positions were diametrically opposed on future obligations to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.64 
One outcome of the Cancún decisions was the formalization of the “pledge and 
review” regime for developed-country mitigation and the NAMAs concept for 
developing-country mitigation. China and India made clear that they would not endorse 
any agreement that did not commit developed countries to take on further emission 
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S.—which is not a party to the 
Kyoto Protocol—wanted to replace Kyoto with a new agreement that would include 
binding commitments for all countries. 
Another outcome of Cancún was the fact that the Green Climate Fund—which 
was established at the COP-15 in Copenhagen65 to help address the questions of how to 
finance low-carbon development strategies in developing countries, since this is one of 
the most important issues of climate negotiations—was strengthened and designated as 
an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC under its Article 11, with 
arrangements to be concluded between the COP and the Green Climate Fund to ensure 
that it is “accountable to and functions under the guidance of” the COP.66 Moreover, the 
Green Climate Fund will have a governing board of 24 members, comprising an equal 
number of members from developed and developing country parties.67 Representatives 
                                                                                                                                                 
compatible with that regime. See Firger, D. “Harmonizing Climate Change and International Investment 
Law: Threats, Challenges and Opportunities,” 2011. 
64 For an analysis of COP-16, see Morgan, J. et al., “Reflections on the Cancún Agreements,” World 
Resources Institute, December 2010, available at http://pdf.wri.org/reflections_on_cancun_agreements.pdf. 
65 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, 18 December 2009, para. 10. 
66 See http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 102. 
67 See Bird, N., Brown, J. and Schalatek, L. “Design Challenges for the Green Climate Fund,” Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung/Overseas Development Institute, Climate Finance Policy Brief No. 4, January 2011; Ghosh, 
A. “Negotiating Around Tradeoffs: Alternative Institutional Designs for Climate Finance,” ECP Report No. 
10, December 2010. 
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from developing country parties should include representatives from the relevant UN 
regional groupings, as well as representatives from the relevant small island developing 
states and least developed countries.68 Furthermore, the World Bank was given a three-
year interim mandate to serve as trustee, subject to review.69 
The Fund would be designed by a Transitional Committee70 made up of a 
majority of developing countries71 and will have an independent secretariat.72 The types 
of issues that the Transitional Committee has been asked to look at include inter alia: a) 
the legal and institutional arrangements for the establishment and operationalization of 
the Green Climate Fund; b) rules of procedure of the Board and other governance issues 
related to the Board; c) methods to manage large scale financial resources from a number 
of sources and to be delivered through a number of instruments; d) methods to enhance 
complementarity between the Green Climate Fund’s activities  and those of other 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral funding mechanisms and institutions; e) mechanisms 
to ensure financial accountability and to evaluate the performance of activities supported 
by the fund; f) mechanisms to ensure the application of environmental and social 
safeguards, as well as internationally accepted fiduciary standards and sound financial 
                                                 
68 See http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 103. 
69 Ibid., para. 107. 
70 See http://unfccc.int/cancun_agreements/green_climate_fund/items/5869.php. 
71 The 40-member committee will be made up of 15 developed countries and 25 developing countries 
(seven from Africa, seven from Asia, seven from the Group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries, 
two from small island developing states, and two least-developed countries). See 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 109. 
72 Ibid., para. 108. 
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management to the fund activities; g) mechanisms to ensure stakeholder input and 
participation.73 
Moreover, the pledges of Copenhagen to provide US$30 billion annually in fast-
start finance between 2010 and 2012, and US$100 billion per annum by 2020,74 which 
will flow from developed to developing countries, are important for two main reasons: 1) 
as a means of financing projects for mitigation of GHG emissions and adaptation to the 
adverse effects of climate change in developing countries; and 2) as part of the broader 
political bargain that needs to be reached between developed and developing countries 
regarding climate change. 
Cancún also secures the survival of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism 
program and opens up the possibility for its expansion.75 Another major outcome—
particularly for China—can be seen in the establishment of an international system for 
providing measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) for mitigation actions, a 
significant contrast to what transpired in Copenhagen the year before. This transparency 
issue had seemed too difficult to solve in the weeks leading up to Cancún, since the U.S. 
insisted that it be a part of any financing package, and China resolutely against anything 
of that nature. The Cancún decisions also made provisions for several new institutions, 
                                                 
73 For a full list of issues the Green Climate Fund is expected to do, see Annex III of the COP-16 Decision, 
available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, p. 27. 
74 Copenhagen Accord, FCCC/CP/2009/L.7, 18 December 2009, para. 8. 
75 See 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/conference_documents/application/pdf/20101204_cop16_cmp_guid
ance_cdm.pdf. 
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including a new Technology Mechanism,76 a Registry for recording NAMAs and 
international support for NAMAs,77 and a Standing Committee on Finance.78 
Regarding the Standing Committee, it will assist the COP in exercising its 
functions with respect to the financial mechanism. In particular, the COP’s decision 
refers to the Standing Committee improving “coherence and coordination”79 in the 
delivery of climate change financing, rationalization of the financial mechanism, 
mobilization of financial resources, as well as measurement, reporting and verification of 
support provided to developing countries. There is no further guidance given to the nature 
of the Standing Committee’s functions, nor how it is to achieve these broadly stated 
objectives. Instead, the COP’s decision provides for the parties to “further define the 
roles and functions”80 of the Standing Committee at some future time. The composition 
of the Committee, the manner in which its members will be appointed, and the nature of 
its interactions with the COP must also be resolved. 
Moreover, as laid out in the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries will continue to 
not be penalized for failing to meet their emissions targets. In the end, China also 
managed to set its reduction target based on emissions intensity, which is a less arduous 
target based on carbon emissions per unit of economic output. Developed countries, on 
                                                 
76 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 117. 
77 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 53. 
78 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 112. On the issue of how to 
make operational a COP Standing Committee on Finance to support the governance of the UNFCCC 
financial mechanism, see Müller, B. “Time to Roll Up the Sleeves – Even Higher!: Long-term Climate 
Finance After Cancún,” Oxford Energy and Environment Brief, January 2011 (arguing that all relevant 
sectors ought to be actively involved in the design process of the new Green Climate Fund). 
79 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 112. 
80 Ibid. 
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the other hand, had been pushing for commitments capping total emissions. The 2-
degrees-Celsius warming target, set in the Copenhagen Accord, was also confirmed in 
Cancún, although a provision was also made for the later review of this objective on the 
basis of best‐available scientific knowledge.81 
A further outcome of Cancún was the Cancún Adaptation Framework,82 whereby 
parties are invited to enhance adaptation action, even internationally, through: planning 
and implementation of adaptation actions identified in national adaptation planning 
processes; impact, vulnerability, and adaptation assessments; strengthening institutional 
capacities and enabling environments; building resilience of socio-economic and 
ecological systems; enhancing disaster risk reduction strategies; technology development 
and transfer; and improving access to climate-related data.83 
 
2.8.2. A Note on Climate Finance 
The obligation for developed countries to provide “new and additional [financial] 
resources”84 for these purposes originates in Articles 4.3 and 4.4 of the UNFCCC, 
although it really was not until the COP-15 in Copenhagen that the parties started to 
attach real importance to it as part of a broader deal on climate change. Thus, current 
                                                 
81 See Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention, para 4, available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf. 
82 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf#page=3, paras. 11-35; see also 
Morgan, J. “Reflections on the Cancún Agreements,” World Res. Inst., Dec. 14, 2010, available at 
http://pdf.wri.org/reflections_on_Cancún_ agreements.pdf. 
83 Efforts to anchor text in an outcome document will continue as the international community works 
towards draft treaty language that can become a broadly-agreed-upon-ratified instrument. See Statement at 
the high-level segment by Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary, UNFCCC, Sixteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties and the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Cancún, 7 December 2010, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/101207_cop16_hls_cfig.pdf. 
84 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 95. 
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negotiations regarding climate finance within the UNFCCC refer to this relatively narrow 
North-South conception of climate finance. A broader conception of climate finance 
would include all cross-border financial flows to support mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries. Thus, this definition would also include South-South flows, that is, 
the provision of financial support by one developing country to another. There are a 
number of examples of developing countries that are, in fact, donors for climate-related 
projects in other developing countries, despite the lack of obligation to provide such 
assistance, as is the case of China and the United Arab Emirates. The broadest conception 
of climate finance would also include domestic investment within developing countries. 
Cross-border flows represent only a fraction of the total amount that will ultimately be 
invested in meeting mitigation and adaptation objectives, with the bulk of funds actually 
being locally generated domestically through public and private channels. 
Climate finance includes both public funds (that is, funds that originate from 
governments) and private funds (provided by firms and investors), where public funds are 
often used as a way of leveraging further financial flows from the private sector. 
International flows of climate finance currently move through three main channels: 1) 
public finance channeled through UNFCCC-controlled mechanisms—primarily the 
Global Environment Facility;85 2) public finance provided outside the UNFCCC 
framework, through multilateral and bilateral assistance programs as well as multilateral 
development banks; and 3) private funds flowing through regulated and voluntary carbon 
and other offset markets—including the Clean Development Mechanism established and 
governed under the UNFCCC, and other market arrangements outside the UNFCCC. 
                                                 
85 For more information on the Global Environment Facility, see http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef. 
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To date, the governance of climate finance has been a relatively ad hoc affair. 
Some funds are channeled through UNFCCC mechanisms such as the Global 
Environment Facility,86 the Adaptation Fund,87 and the Clean Development 
Mechanism,88 over which the Conference of Parties has varying degrees of control. The 
greater proportion of funds flows outside the UNFCCC through a multitude of bilateral 
and multilateral funding initiatives, and through multilateral development banks (most 
notably, the World Bank).89 There is no overarching mechanism that coordinates or 
controls these diverse and dispersed efforts.  
Regarding climate finance outcomes from the COP-16, the Cancún COP-16 
decision has started to lay the foundations for a scaled-up climate finance regime.90 Most 
notably, the COP took note of the commitment by developed countries to provide US$30 
billion in fast-start finance for the period of 2010-2012,91 and invited parties to submit 
information to the secretariat regarding the resources that have been provided to meet this 
commitment.92 Moreover, the COP recognized the developed countries’ commitment to 
jointly mobilize US$100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing 
                                                 
86 See http://www.thegef.org/gef/; see also http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/gef-trust-fund. For an 
analysis, see Streck, C. “The Global Environment Facility – A Role Model for International Governance?” 
2 Global Environmental Politics, 71, 2001. 
87 See http://www.climatefinanceoptions.org/cfo/node/147; see also 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/adaptation-fund. For an analysis of the adaptation fund, see 
Brown, J. Bird, N. & Schalatek, L. “Direct Access to the Adaptation Fund: Realizing the Potential of 
National Implementing Entities,” Heirich Böll Stiftung/ODI Climate Finance Policy Brief No. 3, November 
2010. 
88 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html. 
89 See http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/. 
90 See Van Melle, T., Höhne, N. and Ward, M. “International Climate Financing: From Cancún to a 2 
degree C Stabilisation Pathway,” Ecofys, February 2011 (which examines potential sources of revenues 
and analyzes which instruments are most compatible with these sources and with the climate objectives. 
Ultimately, the paper provides suggestions for progress in international climate financing after Cancún 
towards a 2°C stabilization pathway). 
91 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf, para. 95. 
92 Ibid., para. 96. 
  Dr Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
 29
countries,93 and agreed that funds will come from a wide variety of sources, public and 
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources, given this amount cannot 
simply come from the public revenues of developed countries.94 Furthermore, the COP 
decided that there should be enhanced reporting by developed countries in national 
communications of the provision of financial, technological and capacity-building 
support to developing countries, and that the guidelines for reporting and review of this 
information should be improved.95 Besides, the COP decided that developing countries 
shall submit biennial reports containing updates (among other things) of support 
received.96 
To sum up the COP-16, Cancún buried the failure of Copenhagen and provided 
opportunities to advance global cooperation in adaptation, forests, climate finance, 
technology transfer, and capacity-building. On the other hand, the Cancún Agreements 
also leave much to be desired.97 This is particularly true in terms of mitigation, where a 
“pledge and review” system, first articulated in the Accord, has now become an accepted 
modality for developed country mitigation. Furthermore, the “pledge and review” system 
also places mitigation responsibilities with developing countries. What is then the 
significance of the Cancún outcome for the UNFCCC process and for the possible 
creation of a global climate agreement? What is the way forward? 
 
                                                 
93 Ibid., para. 98. 
94 Ibid., para. 99. 
95 Ibid., para. 42. 
96 Ibid., para. 60 (c). 
97 See La Vina, A., Ang, L & Dulce, J. “The Cancún Agreements: Do they advance global cooperation on 
climate change?” Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (which outlines and 
reflects on the circumstances that led to the Cancún Agreements, analyzes their substance and provides 
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3. Analyzing the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol addresses the issue of climate change. However, the legal document 
by no means reflects a global understanding on how to handle the issue of global 
warming.98 In fact, the lack of understanding among the various nations of the world has 
reached a point where environmental policy-makers see a number of possible scenarios to 
global warming: 1) making amendments to the Kyoto Protocol, by changing the current 
targets and timetable into a long-term view of global warming;99 2) leaving the agreement 
unratified, given that the U.S. does not agree with the Kyoto Protocol; and 3) finding a 
middle ground between the two previous possibilities, which is the creation of a new 
mechanism where nations meet in international environmental fora and voluntarily 
exchange views with no legal commitments. 
In order to move forward, we should stop thinking of global warming only from a 
cost-benefit point of view and instead take public health and safety requirements into 
account to a greater extent. Since U.S. and EU representatives have found themselves 
deadlocked at several fora such as in Morocco for the October 2001 COP-7 to the 
UNFCCC and more recently at the COP-15 in Copenhagen, some recommendations are 
made at the end of this article as to how to move forward. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
some insights over the future of global cooperation on climate change). See also “Understanding the 2010 
Cancún Agreement,” Energy Business Reports, December 2010. 
98 For a global analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, see Cameron, P. & Zillman, D. (eds.) Kyoto: From 
Principles to Practice, Kluwer, 2001; Victor, D. The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to 
Slow Global Warming, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001; Kushner, J. Global Climate 
Change and the Road to Extinction: The Legal and Planning Response, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic 
Press, 2009 
99 For an analysis of the long-term view of global warming, see Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (eds.), 
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Topic 5, pp. 63-70, available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
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3.1. What is the Kyoto Protocol? 
The main objective of the Protocol is to reduce worldwide emissions of GHG. Article 3.1 
of the Kyoto Protocol shows three key variables used throughout the Protocol: 1) target: 
reduction of GHG emissions of Annex I countries by at least 5 per cent below the 1990 
levels. Critics have been saying this target is unrealistic and far from solving global 
warming; 2) timetable: the period between 2008 and 2012; and 3) actors: only developed 
countries are legally bound; developing countries have no formal binding targets. In other 
words, the aim is the reduction of GHG emissions of developed countries by at least 5 per 
cent below the 1990 levels by the period 2008-2012. 
Delegates to the Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the UNFCCC agreed to the 
following provisions: 
 Developed Countries—Thirty-eight developed countries plus the European 
Community (i.e., the European Union since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009), listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed to reduce their emissions of six 
GHG.100 Collectively, developed countries agreed to cut back their GHG emissions by a 
total of at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012.101 The six gases 
include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and three ozone-
damaging fluorocarbons not covered by the Montreal Protocol that banned global 
chlorofluorocarbons (i.e., hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)).102 The European Union agreed to reduce its emissions by 8 
                                                 
100 See Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol for a list of the six greenhouse gases. 
101 Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
102 For an analysis of the lessons from the Montreal Protocol for climate change negotiators, see Smith, R. 
“The Road to a Climate Change Agreement Runs Through Montreal,” Peterson Institute for International 
Economics Policy Brief, Number PB10-21, August 2010. 
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per cent below 1990 levels;103 the United States signed on to a 7 per cent reduction; and 
Japan agreed to a 6 per cent reduction. Some countries with smaller economies such as 
Iceland,104 Australia,105 and Norway,106 were allowed to actually increase their emissions 
relative to 1990 levels (respectively 10 per cent, 8 per cent, and 1 per cent)107 before the 
2009 Copenhagen Accord. Other countries were allowed to stay at the same level as in 
1990, i.e., New Zealand.108 The rest of the industrialized countries are to reduce their 
emissions by between 6 per cent and 8 per cent from 1990 levels in the period 2008–
2012. They must comply with the limits by 2012. 
However, the 2009 non-binding Copenhagen Accord defines new targets and new 
constraints. For example, Norway expressed its will to reduce emissions by 40 per cent 
by 2020 based on the 1990 levels, provided that major emitting Parties agreed to 
adequate emission reductions in line with the 2 degrees Celsius target.109 In the same 
way, Australia aims at a 5 to 15-25 per cent reduction based on 2000 levels by 2020, 
whereas New Zealand aims at 10-20 per cent below the 1990 levels by 2020.110 Thus, 
none of the countries that formerly benefited from the possibility to increase or to keep 
                                                 
103 On the EU’s climate policy from a legal perspective, see Massai, L. “Legal Challenges in European 
Climate Policy,” in Douma, W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal 
and Policy Challenges of Climate Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 13-27. 
104 For a summary of Iceland’s GHG emissions from 1990 to 2008, see 
http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/isl_ghg_profile.pdf. 
105 For a summary of Australia’s GHG emissions from 1990 to 2008, see 
http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/aus_ghg_profile.pdf. 
106 For a summary of Norway’s GHG emissions from 1990 to 2008, see 
http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/nor_ghg_profile.pdf. 
107 Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. 
108 For a summary of New Zealand’s GHG emissions from 1990 to 2008, see 
http://unfccc.int/files/ghg_emissions_data/application/pdf/nzl_ghg_profile.pdf. 
109 See letter by the Norwegian minister of the environment, “The Copenhagen Accord – Norway’s 
emissions targets,” 29 January 2010, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/norwaycphaccord_app1.pdf. 
110 UNFCCC, “Appendix I - Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020,” available at 
http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php. 
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constant their emissions will be given further flexibility. All national emissions are to be 
reduced, although these targets are not binding. 
 Countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy—In the 
pre-Copenhagen Accord era, countries undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy but also classified along with the EU, Japan, and the U.S. as Annex I parties to 
the UNFCCC—including Russia111 and Ukraine among others—were expected to freeze 
their emissions at the 1990 levels but were not bound to make any reductions. Since the 
Copenhagen Accord, Russia is willing to reduce its emissions by 15-25 per cent below 
the 1990 levels by 2020, whereas Ukraine by 20 per cent below the 1990 levels.112 
 Developing Countries— Most developing countries are parties to the Protocol, 
but are not subject to any emissions limitations obligations. Countries in the process of 
becoming industrialized but possessing limited resources with which to combat their 
environmental problems—including China and India—have no formal binding targets, 
but have the option to set voluntary reduction targets. Developing countries on the whole 
support Kyoto because it allocates binding targets for emissions reductions and applies 
only to industrialized nations. According to the emerging economies, industrialized 
countries have been responsible for the vast majority of CO2 in the atmosphere. 
However, recent data show that the developing world is responsible for the majority of 
the world’s GHG emissions. This trend is only projected to increase.113 
 
                                                 
111 On Russia and the Kyoto Protocol, see Douma, W. & Ratsiborinskaya, D. “The Russian Federation and 
the Kyoto Protocol,” in Douma, W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: 
Legal and Policy Challenges of Climate Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 135-145. 
112 UNFCCC, “Appendix I - Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020,” available at 
http://unfccc.int/home/items/5264.php. 
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3.2. Main Points of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol makes the following points: 
1) The Protocol was opened for signature for one year starting 16 March 1998. 
The Protocol was adopted at the third session of the Conference of the Parties to the 1992 
UNFCCC, held at Kyoto from 1 to 11 December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol was open for 
signature by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties to 
the Convention at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 
15 March 1999 in accordance with its Article 24.1. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force 
on 16 February 2005 in accordance with Article 25.1, that is “the ninetieth day after the 
date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included 
in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide 
emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of 
ratification,114 acceptance, approval or accession.”115 
2) Each country’s emissions target must be achieved by the period 2008-2012. It 
will be calculated as an average over the five years. “Demonstrable progress” must have 
been made by 2005.116 Cuts in the three most important gases responsible for causing 
global warming—carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)—will 
be measured against a base year of 1990 (with exceptions for some countries with 
                                                                                                                                                 
113 For a country comparison of CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2007, see Millennium Development 
Goals Indicators, available at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid=. 
114 (footnote not in original text) Ratification defines the international act whereby a State indicates its 
consent to be bound to a treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act. In the case of 
multilateral treaties, the usual procedure for ratification is for the depositary to collect the ratifications of all 
States, keeping all parties informed of the situation. The institution of ratification grants States the 
necessary time-frame to seek the required approval for the treaty on the domestic level and to enact the 
necessary legislation to give domestic effect to that treaty. See Articles 2(1)(b), 14(1), and 16 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
115 Article 25.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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economies in transition). Cuts in three long-lived industrial gases—hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)—can be measured 
against either a 1990 or 1995 baseline.117 The Protocol’s first commitment period (2008-
2012) for reducing greenhouse gas emissions will conclude at the end of 2012.118 
 
3) Since emissions levels would increase without a Protocol, actual emission 
reductions will be much larger than 5 per cent. Many industrialized countries did not 
succeed in meeting their earlier non-binding aim of returning emissions to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000, so their emissions have in fact risen since 1990. Compared to emissions 
levels that would have been expected by 2010 without emissions-control measures, the 
Protocol target represents a 29 per cent cut. 
4) Certain degree of flexibility given to countries in how they make and 
measure their emission reductions. In particular, an international “emissions trading” 
regime119 will be established, allowing industrialized countries to buy and sell emissions 
credits amongst themselves. Countries will also be able to acquire “emission reduction 
units”120 by financing certain kinds of projects in other developed countries. In addition, a 
“clean development mechanism”121 will enable industrialized countries to finance 
emissions-reduction projects in developing countries and to receive credit for doing so.122 
The operational guidelines for these various schemes must still be further elaborated.123 
                                                                                                                                                 
116 Article 3.2 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
117 Article 3.8 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
118 Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
119 For verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading, see Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
120 Article 3.10 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
121 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
122 On climate finance, see Stewart, R., Kingsbury, B. and Rudyk, B. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory 
and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development, NYU Press, 2009 (which examines 
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5) Countries will pursue emission reduction in a wide range of economic 
sectors. The Kyoto Protocol encourages governments to cooperate with one another and 
to improve energy efficiency, reform their energy and transportation sectors, promote 
renewable forms of energy, phase out inappropriate fiscal measures and market 
imperfections, limit methane emissions from waste management and energy systems, and 
protect forests and other carbon “sinks.”124 
6) The Protocol will advance the implementation of existing commitments by all 
countries. Both developed and developing countries agree to take measures to limit 
emissions and promote adaptation to future climate change impacts; submit information 
on their national climate change programs and inventories; promote technology transfer; 
cooperate on scientific and technical research; and promote public awareness, education, 
and training. The Protocol also reiterates the need to provide “new and additional”125 
                                                                                                                                                 
the design of climate finance mechanisms, as well as the institutions and governance mechanisms required 
to ensure that the decentralized climate finance system functions effectively); see also Enting, K. & 
Harmeling, S. “German Climate Finance Put to the Test: An Assessment of German Financial Support for 
Climate-Related Activities in Developing Countries from a Development Policy Perspective,” Stuttgart, 
Germanwatch, November 2010; Pew Center, “Strengthening International Climate Finance,” December 
2010, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/strengthening-international-climate-finance.pdf. 
123 For literature on GHG emission reduction, see Keohane, R. & Victor, D. “The Regime Complex for 
Climate Change,” Discussion Paper 2010-33, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Project on International Climate 
Agreements, January 2010; Stavins, R.N., “Options for the Institutional Venue for International Climate 
Change Negotiations,” Issue Brief 10-03, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, May 2010; 
Pacala, S. & Socolow, R. “Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with 
Current Technologies,” Science, Vol. 305, p. 968, 13 August 2004; Stewart, R. & Wiener, J. 
Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 2003, 
Chapter 3; Victor, D. “Fragmented carbon markets and reluctant nations: implications for the design of 
effective architecture,” in Aldy, J.E. & Stavins, R. (eds.) Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global 
Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 133-160; Yu, 
J. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Measures in China,” in Stewart, R., Kingsbury, B. & Rudyk, 
B. (eds.) Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global 
Development, NYU Press, 2009, pp. 228-233; Lizza, R. “How the Senate and the White House Missed 
their best Change to deal with Climate Change,” The New Yorker, 11 October 2010. 
124 Article 2.1(a)(ii) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
125 Article 11.2(a) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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financial resources to meet the “agreed full costs”126 incurred by developing countries in 
carrying out these commitments. 
7) The Kyoto Protocol will be periodically reviewed. The Kyoto Protocol 
mandates that the Parties take “appropriate action”127 on the basis of the best available 
scientific, technical, and socio-economic information. The first review took place in 2006 
at the second COP serving the Protocol.128 Talks on commitments for the post-2012 
period129 started in 2005 to discuss future commitments for industrialized countries under 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol established a working group in December 2005 called the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) in an effort to agree to terms for a second commitment period for emissions 
limitations post-2012. However, since the Protocol’s second commitment period is only 
for developed countries, there is some skepticism as to whether there is any added value 
for the EU finding itself alone in a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 
given that Japan, China, the U.S., Canada, and Russia are probably not going to join, 
since they have been signaling their opposition to an extension of the Kyoto Protocol, and 
many developing countries still insist that they should not be subject to binding 
limitations under the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the prospects of reaching such an 
                                                 
126 Article 11.2(a) of the Kyoto Protocol. 
127 Article 9.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
128 To access the reports of the review, visit http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_12/items/3754.php. 
129 2012 is the date in which the first commitment of the Kyoto Protocol comes to an end. It is therefore 
wrong to claim that post-2012 refers to the end of the Kyoto Protocol. For an analysis of climate change 
governance beyond 2012, see Biermann, F., Pattberg, P., and Zelli, F. (eds.) Global Climate Governance 
Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptation, Cambridge University Press, 2010 (addressing three 
questions central to any new climate agreement: What is the most effective overall legal and institutional 
architecture for successful and equitable climate politics? What role should non-state actors play, including 
multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, public–private partnerships, and market 
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agreement are slim. With no agreement having emerged from the 2009 COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, the future of the Kyoto Protocol, which would require negotiation of 
emission targets for the period post-2012, is in serious doubt. 
 
3.3. Major Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, countries must meet their targets primarily through national 
measures. However, the Kyoto Protocol offers them an additional means of meeting their 
targets by way of three market-based mechanisms to increase flexibility and reduce the 
costs of making emissions cuts: 1) the clean development mechanism (CDM),130 2) 
emissions trading,131 and 3) joint implementation. Flexibility would mean that the same 
goals could be met at lower cost, since where the reductions occur is irrelevant to total 
atmospheric accumulation of GHG. 
1) The clean development mechanism, which is reflected in Article 12 of the 
Protocol, enables industrialized countries with an emissions-limitation commitment to 
finance emissions-avoiding projects (including through initiative and investment by their 
private firms) in developing countries and to receive credit for doing so by splitting the 
resulting tradable credits between the two countries. This would offer an incentive for 
industrial firms to invest in projects that reduce emissions from developing countries. It 
also allows wealthy countries to earn marketable certified emissions reduction credits 
(CERs),132 which can be counted toward meeting their emission reduction targets under 
                                                                                                                                                 
mechanisms in general? How can we deal with the growing challenge of adapting our existing institutions 
to a substantially warmer world?). 
130 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
131 Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
132 See UNFCCC, CDM Statistics, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html. 
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the Kyoto Protocol. Private firms that invest in CDM projects can obtain CERs to use 
against their GHG regulatory limitations requirements in developed countries where they 
operate, or sell CERs in global carbon markets. However, no agreement has been reached 
on how to put this mechanism into practice. Making the CDM work will be very 
difficult,133 but there is no real alternative for engaging developing countries in a 
worldwide effort to control emissions while ensuring that industrialized countries rightly 
pay for most of the cost. 
 The CDM has two main objectives: first, to stimulate investment in emissions 
reductions in developing countries; and second, to give industrialized countries some 
flexibility and potential cost savings in how they meet their emissions reduction targets. 
Because several of the main GHGs, particularly carbon dioxide, are nearly uniformly 
distributed throughout the atmosphere regardless of location of emissions, it is irrelevant 
from an environmental viewpoint where in the world emissions limitations are achieved. 
Also, it is often much cheaper to achieve GHG emissions reductions in developing 
countries than in developed countries. 
The clean development mechanism has been operational since 2006. More than 
2,300 projects are registered with an annual average of more than 380,000,000 CERs (in 
tons of CO2). Even if no agreement has been reached on how to put this mechanism into 
practice, it has been improved through two decisions, the first one adopting modalities, 
                                                 
133 See Campbell, D. et al., “After Copenhagen: The Impossibility of Carbon Trading,” LSE Law, Society 
and Economy Working Papers, No. 22/2010 (arguing that carbon trading—which will reduce emissions in 
line with any of the targets set for avoiding dangerous anthropological interference—is impossible and that, 
reflecting the fatal shortcomings of the Kyoto Protocol, the operation of the CDM so far has not merely 
failed to secure reductions, but in all likelihood has actually increased the absolute level of emissions). 
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procedures, and guidance on the CDM in 2005.134 In 2009, a second decision was 
adopted providing further guidance on the CDM.135 
2) Emissions trading is a mechanism whereby Parties with emissions commitments 
(Annex I countries)136 may trade their emission allowances with other Parties. The aim is 
to improve the overall flexibility and economic efficiency of making emissions cuts. This 
mechanism would allow industrialized countries to buy excess emissions permits from 
Russia and Ukraine, for instance, since they both have a large surplus resulting from 
economic collapse and emissions are likely to be much lower than their targets.137 Such 
transfers will do little or nothing to help slow global warming while they will inevitably 
enrich Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Another problem is that the EU countries, on one side, and the U.S., Norway, and 
Japan, on the other, have had radically different views on the use of emissions trading 
credits and no compromise seemed possible up to 2005.138 The EU’s policy was that at 
least 50 per cent of each country’s obligation should be fulfilled domestically.139 
However, the U.S., Japan, and Norway wanted what their representatives call qualitative 
                                                 
134 See UNFCCC, “Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol at its first session,” FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1, 3/CMP.1 and 4/CMP.1, pp. 6-60, 
2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf. 
135 See UNFCCC, “Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol at its fifth session,” pp. 1-8, 2009, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_12/application/pdf/cmp_8.pdf. 
136 For a list of Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC, see 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php. 
137 On emissions permits, see Bossley, L. “Are Current Trade Rules Sufficient for Regulating Trade in 
Emissions Permits?” in Pauwelyn, J. (ed.) Global Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the 
Environment, Geneva: Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, 2010, pp. 161-164. 
138 See Sains, A. “Laying an Egg in The Hague. No Deal reached at Global Warming Conference” in 
Europe: The Green Issue, published by the Delegation of the European Commission to the U.S., February 
2001, pp. 10-13, at 11. 
139 For the case of the EU emissions trading directive, see Farnsworth, N. “The EU Emissions Trading 
Directive: Time for Revision?” in Douma, W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and 
Beyond: Legal and Policy Challenges of Climate Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 29-38. 
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evaluations. This concept essentially implies the right to evaluate emissions at home and 
efforts to cut emissions abroad on a case-by-case basis and not be tied to a 50 per cent 
domestic requirement.140 Those who are entirely against emissions trading say this 
practice will allow wealthier industrialized countries to avoid the responsibility of 
reducing their greenhouse gas emissions at home, and dump the problem on developing 
countries instead.141 
 However, the rules in emissions trading were improved in 2005 by a decision 
providing modalities, rules, and guidance.142 These rules have progressively evolved into 
a de facto carbon market. 
3) Last but not least, under the joint implementation concept, the Kyoto Protocol 
establishes a mechanism whereby a developed country can receive “emissions reduction 
units”143 when it helps to finance projects that reduce net emissions in another developed 
country (including countries with economies in transition). Some aspects of this approach 
are being tested as Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ),144 which means that under a pilot 
phase that ended in 2000, these activities could be carried out through partnership 
                                                 
140 Sains, A. “Laying an Egg in The Hague. No Deal reached at Global Warming Conference” in Europe: 
The Green Issue, published by the Delegation of the European Commission to the U.S., February 2001, pp. 
10-13, at 11. 
141 Ibid. at 13. 
142 See UNFCCC, “Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol at its first session”, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 11/CMP.1, pp. 17-21, 2005, 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=17. 
143 Article 3.10 & 11 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
144 Activities implemented jointly (AIJ) refers to “the pilot phase for Joint Implementation, as defined in 
Article 4.2(a) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that allows for 
project activity among developed countries (and their companies) and between developed and developing 
countries (and their companies). AIJ is intended to allow parties to the UNFCCC to gain experience in 
jointly implemented projects. There is no credit for AIJ during the pilot phase. A decision remains on the 
future of AIJ projects and how they may relate to the Kyoto mechanisms. As a simple form of tradable 
permits, AIJ and other market-based schemes represent potential mechanisms for stimulating additional 
resource flows for reducing emissions.” See 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/annexessglossary-a-d.html. 
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between an investor from a developed country and a counterpart in a host country. The 
purpose is to involve private-sector money in the transfer of technology and know-
how.145 The concept of joint implementation has been part of global climate policy-
making since its inclusion in the UNFCCC in 1992. Article 4.2 of the UNFCCC states 
that “developed country Parties and other Parties included in annex I […] may implement 
[…] policies and measures jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in 
contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention…”.146 
The joint implementation mechanism has also been defined through guidelines in 
a 2005 decision.147 In particular, a Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee was 
created, that is responsible for supervising of the verification procedure of the 
guidelines.148 The Committee has been meeting on average four times a year since 2006 
and produces guidance and procedural improvement.149 Technical improvements were 
also included during the 2009 Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).150 
 
                                                 
145 For an analysis of the role of joint implementation in the EU context, see van der Gaast, W. “The Role 
of Joint Implementation within the Context of EU Policies,” in Douma, W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. 
(eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal and Policy Challenges of Climate Change, The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2007, pp. 39-57. 
146 Emphasis added. 
147 UNFCCC, “Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol,” 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, 9/CMP.1, pp. 2-14, 2005, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a02.pdf#page=2. 
148 Ibid. at paras. 30-45. 
149 Reports of the meetings are available at http://ji.unfccc.int/Sup_Committee/Meetings/index.html. 
150 UNFCCC, “Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol at its fifth session”, p. 12, 2009, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cmp5/eng/21a01.pdf#page=12. 
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3.4. Problems with the Kyoto Protocol 
The question is whether the Kyoto Protocol is a positive and effective legal instrument to 
address climate change. One could argue that the Protocol is a positive sign, since it 
acknowledges the problem. However, for others, the Kyoto Protocol is both far too strong 
(the fulfillment of its objective implies a high economic cost151 and it would require a 
high economic sacrifice for some countries)152 and yet totally inadequate to address the 
long-term climate challenge (in other words, it requires only a small percentage of GHG 
emission reduction—5 per cent—below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 from only 
few countries, i.e., only developed countries).153 So, even if we fulfill the Kyoto 
Protocol’s requirement, we do not even come close to curbing the problem. Worse, the 
Protocol incorporates dangers that could make solutions even more difficult. 
Despite all this, U.S. President G.W. Bush said that he did not agree with the 
current implications of the Kyoto Protocol, since 80 per cent of the world (i.e., 
developing countries) is not legally bound by the agreement.154 His argument was that 
there were other priorities in his political agenda. According to President G.W. Bush, the 
energy crisis in the U.S., especially in California, in 2000-2001 was an immediate 
problem which had to be solved, whereas the environment is a long-term problem. My 
                                                 
151 See generally House of Lords, “The Economics of Climate Change,” Volume I: Report, Select 
Committee on Economic Affairs, 2005. 
152 In this sense, William Antholis and Strobe Talbott note that the word ‘sacrifice’, just like the word ‘tax’, 
has become almost a taboo in American political discourse. See Antholis, W. and Talbott, S. Fast Forward: 
Ethics and Politics in the Age of Global Warming, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 
114. 
153 See, among those against the Kyoto Protocol, Benedick, R. “How Workable is the Kyoto Protocol? How 
to Salvage the Kyoto Protocol,” Weathervane, March 1998. 
154 Brown-Humes, C., Norman, P. & Woffle, R. “EU confronts Bush on climate change,” in Financial 
Times, March 25, 2001. 
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conclusion, therefore, is that the G.W. Bush administration killed the Kyoto Protocol and 
should have been responsible for an alternative. 
The Kyoto Protocol tries to address a long-term problem with unfeasible short-
term measures. For the purpose of this article, we shall focus on two main technical-
procedural problems: 1) implementation and 2) enforcement mechanism. 
1. Implementation (Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol). This was discussed in Bonn in 
1999, but unfortunately little progress was made. This means that we still need regimes 
sufficiently detailed with regard to the implementation of international environmental 
agreements. Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol clearly says that  
 
“parties shall approve appropriate and effective procedures and 
mechanisms to determine and address cases of non-compliance.”  
 
To work out the rules implementing the vague and general language of the Protocol was 
actually the purpose of the first part of the COP-6, which met in The Hague in November 
2000.155 The whole negotiation collapsed due to the desire of the U.S. to include carbon 
sinks as part of the agreement. While a compromise had been prepared, the EU rejected 
the proposal. The negotiation was thus postponed, and took place during the second 
COP-6, held in Bonn in July 2001. Several issues were agreed, in particular on the Kyoto 
mechanisms and on the compliance system,156 as prepared under the Buenos Aires Plan 
of Action.157 
                                                 
155 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 11. 
156 Ott, H.E. “The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol – Paving the Way for Ratification,” International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 469–476, at 472-475, 2001. 
157 The UNFCCC COP-4 adopted a Buenos Aires Action Plan, a two-year plan of action to reduce the risk 
of global climate change by establishing deadlines for finalizing work on the Kyoto Mechanisms (Joint 
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 The industrialized countries (all except the U.S.) that have committed to legally 
binding emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol are seeking to implement them, to 
greater or lesser effect. However, their efforts fall far short of what is required to avoid 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
2. Enforcement mechanism. Enforcement is difficult with any international 
environmental agreement. The Protocol has to find a way to come up with a workable 
and credible compliance regime of emission-reduction rules. To this end, the Joint 
Working Group on Compliance (JWG) was established under the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action, which has been operating since June 1999. In December 2000 in The Hague there 
was a meeting to further develop the Kyoto Protocol’s enforcement mechanism, but there 
was no plan for how countries would comply with their targets.158 
One major issue raised in post-Hague negotiations was whether there should be 
financial penalties for non-compliance.159 Indeed, the 2001 COP-7 ended with an 
agreement on how to enforce the Kyoto Protocol, following the Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action. The package included decisions on compliance rules, the so-called “flexible 
mechanisms,” and monitoring and reporting obligations for Parties. To this end, the 2005 
COP-11 agreed to a compliance regime for the Kyoto Protocol. The Compliance 
                                                                                                                                                 
Implementation, Emissions Trading, and the Clean Development Mechanism), compliance issues and 
policies and measures. 
158 On compliance, see Montini, M. “The Compliance Regime of the Kyoto Protocol,” in Douma, W., 
Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal and Policy Challenges of Climate 
Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 95-109. 
159 On non-compliance and its consequences, see Tabau, A.-S. & Maljean-Dubois, M. “Non-Compliance 
Mechanisms: Interaction between the Kyoto Protocol System and the European Union,” European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2010, pp. 749-763. 
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Committee is elected and has two branches, namely, the facilitative branch and the 
enforcement branch.160 
The facilitative branch shall provide “advice and facilitation to Parties in 
implementing the Protocol,”161 whereas the enforcement branch is responsible for 
determining whether a Party included in Annex I is not in compliance with its emissions 
targets, its methodological and reporting requirements for greenhouse gas inventories, 
and its eligibility requirements under the mechanisms. The sanctions associated with this 
mechanism have been criticized. For example, the potential consequences that sanctions 
could have on countries that comply with the agreement, such as considerable adverse 
welfare effects.162 However, even though it still needs improvement, the enforcement 
mechanism has proven to be effective.163 The enforcement branch issues reports of 
meetings twice a year.164 
A way to convince nations to comply is by demonstrating that it is in their self-
interest to do so. Compliance does not seem probable through punitive sanctions (because 
countries will not accept that), but perhaps countries will ultimately decide to comply to 
avoid appearing uncooperative. The compliance mechanism provides, nevertheless, three 
                                                 
160 For a description of the mechanism relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, see UNFCCC, 
(2005), “Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol at its first session”, FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 27/CMP.1, p. 93, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf#page=92. 
161 Ibid., at p. 95. 
162 Hovi, J. and Kallbekken, S. “The Price of Non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The Remarkable 
Case of Norway,” CICERO Working Paper 2004:07, Oslo, June 2004, available at 
http://www.cicero.uio.no/media/2773.pdf. 
163 For a full assessment of the enforcement mechanism, see Finus, M. “The enforcement mechanisms of 
the Kyoto protocol: flawed or promising concepts?” Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 
1, pp. 13-25, 2008. The effectiveness of each sanction is assessed, especially on pages 19 to 23. Overall, the 
mechanism is deemed effective, but should be improved to ensure more credibility and deter free-rider 
situations. 
164 Reports of the meetings of the enforcement branch can be found at 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/enforcement_branch/items/3785.php. 
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types of sanctions that can be imposed by the enforcement branch in case of non-
compliance of a country with its Kyoto commitments.165 Each type of non-compliance 
triggers a specific course of action. For example, if it is deemed that a Party has exceeded 
its assigned emissions amount, then that Party is declared in non-compliance and must 
make up the difference between its emissions and its assigned amount during the second 
commitment period, with an added deduction of 30 per cent. The Party is then required to 
submit a compliance action plan and is declared ineligible to make transfers under the 
emissions trading provisions.166 
 
3.5. What Options Do We Have Under the Current Situation? 
Of all the countries that signed the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. is the only one that has not 
yet ratified it and therefore is not subject to emissions limitations obligations because it is 
not a party to the Protocol. Since the aim is to contribute toward progress on tackling 
climate change while nonetheless ensuring that U.S. vital interests be protected, we have 
three options. The first option is to continue with the Kyoto Protocol (with or without the 
U.S.), assuming that eventually diplomatic and political pressure will make the U.S. 
Senate ratify the agreement. The EU is prepared to go much further and faster than the 
U.S. since it accepts the necessary level of economic sacrifice in order to solve this long-
                                                 
165 The list of punitive consequences to be imposed by the enforcement branch in the second commitment 
period (2013-2017) on countries that fail to comply in the first period are: (1) deduction from the party’s 
allowance for the second commitment period of 1.3 times the amount of excess emissions in the first 
period; (2) development of a compliance action plan; and (3) suspension of the eligibility to sell permits 
under the emissions trading provisions until that right is reinstated. 
166 See Article 14 of the Agreement on procedures and mechanisms on compliance supplementing the 
Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2001/2/Add.6, 11 June 2001, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop6secpart/02a06.pdf. 
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term problem.167 One interpretation is that the Europeans adopted an intransigent position 
at the COP-6 in The Hague precisely because they predicted the impossibility for 
everyone to achieve their emission reduction goals. They therefore intentionally made 
things so difficult that the U.S. threw in the towel and took the public blame for “killing 
Kyoto.” 
In fact, in 2000 the only EU countries that were close to meeting Kyoto goals 
were Germany (which actually got there by closing down inefficient East German 
industries—for economic, not environmental reasons), and the United Kingdom, which 
essentially just stopped subsidizing its costly and inefficient coal industry and switched to 
cheaper cleaner national gas, which it has in plentiful supply. The UK’s idea of stopping 
fossil-fuel subsidies is essential for reducing energy price distortions, encouraging energy 
conservation and efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and lowering barriers to 
investments in renewable energy technologies. In other words, both Germany and the 
United Kingdom were positioned to achieve Kyoto goals painlessly. 
Years later, the 2005 European Environment Agency report revealed that only the 
UK and Sweden, and possibly France and Germany, were on track to meet their emission 
reduction obligations under the EU bubble.168 However, by 2010 the EU-27 as a bloc had 
made considerable progress to their target of cutting emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 
compared to 1990, and was therefore in a good position to meet the targets imposed by 
the Kyoto Protocol.169 In part due to the 2008 economic recession, the EU as a whole is 
                                                 
167 See Jehl, D. “U.S. Rebuffs European Plea Not to Abandon Climate Pact,” The New York Times, April 4, 
2001, p. A 16. 
168 European Environment Agency, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends and Projections in Europe,” Report 
No. 8, 2005, p. 14, available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/eea_report_2005_8/GHG2005.pdf. 
169 European Environmental Agency, “Recession accelerates the decline in EU greenhouse gas emissions,” 
10 September 2010, available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/recession-accelerates-the-decline-in. 
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already halfway to the self-imposed Copenhagen Accord target of cutting emissions by 
20 per cent by 2020 compared to 1990.170 
The second option is to create a new legal framework that will be convincing to 
the U.S. and major developing countries such as China, since the Kyoto Protocol is 
failing in part due to its short timetables. How can we create a new legal framework? 
There are three plausible scenarios: a) by having a longer time-frame for GHG emission 
reductions (from the current time-frame of 2008-2012 required by the Protocol to a new 
one of 2050); b) with a greater level of emission reduction (from 5 per cent to 35 per 
cent); and c) with a larger number of countries involved (not only developed nations—as 
in the current situation—but also developing nations). 
A “third way”171 would be to create a two-speed protocol on climate change with a 
dual timetable.172 This proposal consists of halving the emission reductions currently 
required by the Kyoto Protocol for industrialized nations. This may not be an optimal 
choice from an environmental perspective. However, given the current political 
circumstances in the U.S. concerning the environment, this modification of reduction 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol may be the only way to move forward on a global 
scale. Halving the emissions cuts and creating a timetable of binding reductions for 
developing nations, provides an incentive for the U.S. administration to commit to Kyoto. 
 
                                                 
170 For a full report on the performance of each EU Member State on greenhouse gas emission reduction 
from 1990 to 2008, see European Environment Agency, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 
1990-2008 and inventory report 2010, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2010. 
171 The notion of “third way” has been borrowed from Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of 
Social Democracy, Polity Press, 1998. 
172 See recommendation number 5 in this article. 
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4. Position of the Main Players 
Although climate change is a truly global issue, for the purposes of this article only three 
main players in the global climate change negotiations will be analyzed: the U.S., the EU, 
and China. Each one of them is geographically and socially diverse, which is taken into 
account when analyzing them. Furthermore, as shown in the chart below, China, the U.S., 
and the EU-27 are the world’s first, second, and third largest emitters of CO2 
respectively,173 and the EU has some of the strongest domestic support to address the 
climate change challenge. 
                                                 
173 See the ranking of the world’s countries by 2007 total CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning, cement 
production, and gas flaring prepared by Thomas Boden,  Gregg Marland, and Robert Andres of the Carbon 
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, available at 
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/top2007.tot. 
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4.1. U.S. Position 
Since 2007, the U.S. has been the second largest source of GHG emissions, only behind 
China, and accounted for approximately 16 per cent of the world’s total emissions as of 
2006.174 However, per capita emissions remain extremely high in the U.S. with 18.376 
                                                 
174 For a comparison of carbon dioxide emissions of the top-20 countries in the world in 2006 and a ranking 
of their per capita emissions, see Netherlands Environment Agency, http://www.pbl.nl/images/Top20-
CO2andGHG-countries-in2006-2005(GB)_tcm61-36276.xls. 
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tons of GHG emissions per year175 (compared to, for example, China with 4.916 tons of 
GHG emissions per year176) as of 2008. The chart below illustrates the top CO2-emitting 
countries and their per capita emissions as of 2004. One observes from the chart that per 
capita emissions in the U.S. remain, by far, ahead of China’s. 
 
Concerning cumulative CO2 emissions, the U.S. remains responsible for 30 per 
cent over the 1900-2005 period and the EU for 23 per cent, while China only counts for 8 
per cent.177 However, according to a high growth scenario over the period 2005-2030, the 
International Energy Agency predicts that the cumulative emissions for China since 1900 
                                                 
175 International Energy Agency Statistics, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights, Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2010, p. 98. 
176 Ibid. at p. 100. 
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will be the same as those of the EU.178 The map below shows that the U.S. is one of the 
worst performers in the world based on its high CO2 emissions from energy use. 
 
 
Source: Maplecroft, 2010 
 
The U.S. uses fossil fuels inefficiently, in part because it has the lowest fuel taxes 
in the industrialized world, but also because its oil and coal industries are politically 
                                                                                                                                                 
177 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007—China and India Insights, Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2007, graph in p. 201. 
178 Ibid., p. 199. 
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influential. One may also note that former U.S. President G.W. Bush and Vice-President 
Cheney are both former oil men, who still have close ties to oil producing companies and 
regions.179 President Obama, however, has proposed green energy tax incentives to 
encourage U.S. businesses to upgrade their commercial buildings and make them more 
efficient.180 As the chart shows, the main sources of energy in the U.S. today are still oil, 
coal, and natural gas: 
 
                                                 
179 Reno, R. “Bush, Cheney Are Oil Men and Oily Guys,” Newsday, 21 September 2000, available at 
http://www.commondreams.org/views/092100-102.htm. 
180 Kirchgaessner, S. & Lemer, J. “Obama proposes ‘green tax’ incentives,” Financial Times.com, 3 
February 2011. 
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Although former U.S. President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol, former U.S. 
President G.W. Bush publicly expressed skepticism, arguing that the Kyoto Agreement, 
as negotiated by the Clinton administration, represented a “lousy deal”181 for the 
American people in general, and the U.S. economy in particular, since the cost is too 
high. The G.W. Bush administration believed that the Kyoto Protocol would damage 
their industries. In fact, even if the G.W. Bush administration had made Kyoto its top 
priority,182 it would have needed perhaps quite some time to craft and adopt 
implementing legislation and win a difficult battle to ratify the treaty.183 This means that 
the U.S. Government would have had only a few years before the Kyoto Protocol’s limits 
on GHG emissions had taken full effect. 
                                                 
181 Forbes, “Bush dubs Kyoto treaty ‘lousy deal’ for US economy,” 7 April 2005, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2005/07/04/afx2122482.html. 
182 On U.S. climate change policy under President G.W. Bush, see Ackerman, S. “What Are Lobbyists 
Saying on Capitol Hill? Climate Change Legislation as a Case Study for Reform,” 37 Envtl. L., 137 (2007); 
Brittany H. “Is President Bush's Vision Impaired? An Analysis of President Bush’s 'Climate VISION' 
Initiative,” 19 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L., 59 (2004-2005); Carlarne, C. “Notes From a Climate Change 
Pressure-Cooker:  Subfederal Attempts at Transformation Meet National Resistance in the USA,” 40 Conn. 
L. Rev., 1351 (2008); Cass, L. The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International 
Norms, Domestic Policies, and Unachievable Commitments, State University of New York Press, 2006; 
Freeman, J. & Vermeule, A. “Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,” 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev., 51; 
Harris, A. “Derogating the Precautionary Principle,” 19 Villanova Envtl. L.J., 1 (2008); Hobley, A. “Is 
Kyoto Dead? Climate Change after Bush,” 10(5) Envtl. Liability, 167 (2002); Kammen, D. & Nemet, G. 
“Reversing the Incredible Shrinking Energy R&D Budget,” Issues in Science and Technology, 84 (2005); 
Rabe, B. Statehouse and Greenhouse: The Emerging Politics of American Climate Change Policy, 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004; Rich, R. et al., “Use and Misuse of Science: Global Climate Change and 
the Bush Administration,” 14(3) Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L., 223 (2007); Rosencranz, A. “U.S. Climate Change 
Policy under G. W. Bush,” 32(4) Golden Gate U. L. Rev., 479 (2002); Thackeray, R. “Struggling for Air: 
The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens' Suits Under the Clean Air Act, and the United States' Options for Addressing 
Global Climate Change,” 14 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 855 (2004); Thomas P. “The Evolution of State 
Climate Change Policy in the United States: Lessons Learned and New Directions,” 14 Widener L.J., 81 
(2004); Thorson, E. “On Thin Ice: The Failure of the United States and the World Heritage Committee to 
Take Climate Change Mitigation Pursuant to the World Heritage Convention Seriously,” 38 Envtl. L., 139 
(2008); Waterman, P. “From Kyoto to ANWR: Critiquing the Bush Administration's Withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change,” 13 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs., 
749 (2003); Wolf, L. “Countervailing a Hidden Subsidy: The U.S. Failure to Require Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Reductions,” 19 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev., 83 (2006). 
183 For an analysis of the effects of incremental domestic legislation on international negotiations to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions, see Brewster, R. “Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block: Incrementalism in 
National Climate Change Legislation,” Yale Law and Policy Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2010, pp. 245-312. 
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An interesting observation is that it was initially believed that if the U.S. stayed 
on its present track, by the time we got to the period 2008-2012, its GHG emissions 
would be perhaps 30 per cent higher than the 1990 levels. However, as can be seen in the 
chart below, the reality is that the U.S.’s actual CO2 emissions for the period 1990-2008 
was 14.9 to 15.3 per cent higher than the 1990 levels, therefore lower than the 
expectation in the early 2000s.184 This nevertheless is far from reaching the mere 5 per 
cent-below-1990-levels target required by Kyoto.185 Also, according to the UNFCCC, big 
EU economies such as the UK and Germany spewed smaller amounts of GHG into the 
atmosphere in 2008 than they did in 1990. Some of the biggest reductions of GHG 
emissions over the period between 1990 and 2008 took place in former Soviet countries 
such as Ukraine, partly because their industries were very polluting before 1990. 
                                                 
184 See IEA Statistics, “CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion: Highlights,” p. 44, 2010, available at 
http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/. 
185 Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Source: UNFCCC 
In a weekly policy meeting, former Vice-President Cheney told a group of 
senators that the campaign pledge to control CO2 was “a mistake,” and that the 
administration was preparing a letter that would say CO2 was not a pollutant.186 G.W. 
Bush’s opposition to climate control mechanisms and to the Kyoto Protocol was crystal 
clear in 2001: “As you know, I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent 
of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from 
compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy. The Senate’s vote, 95-0, 
shows that there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective 
means of addressing global climate change concerns. As you also know, I support a 
comprehensive and balanced national energy policy that takes into account the 
importance of improving air quality. Consistent with this balanced approach, I intend to 
work with the Congress on a multi-pollutant strategy to require power plants to reduce 
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and mercury. Any such strategy would 
include phasing in reductions over a reasonable period of time, providing regulatory 
certainty, and offering market-based incentives to help industry meet the targets. I do not 
believe, however, that the government should impose on power plants mandatory 
emissions reductions for carbon dioxide, which is not a “pollutant” under the Clean Air 
Act.”187  
                                                 
186 See Office of the Press, “Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and 
Roberts,” The White House, which is a response letter dated 13 March 2001 from the U.S. President to 
Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts to their letter of 6 March 2001, asking for the Administration’s 
views on global climate change, in particular the Kyoto Protocol, and efforts to regulate carbon dioxide 
under the Clean Air Act. Available at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/bush_letter010313.pdf. 
187 Ibid. 
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In his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, President G.W. Bush also referred to “the 
incomplete state of scientific knowledge of the causes of, and solutions to, global climate 
change…”188 In the U.S. there has been vigorous debate on the reliability of climate 
change science, with some commentators accusing the IPCC of political bias. However, 
at the initiative of the Royal Society, a group of 16 national academies of science from all 
parts of the world agreed to a statement in the U.S. journal Science, saying that they 
recognized the IPCC as “the world’s most reliable source of information on climate 
change.”189 In the same statement in Science, the academies criticized skeptics who 
question the need to mitigate climate change risks. “We do not consider such doubts 
justified,”190 says the statement. The statement was signed by the scientific academies of 
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Caribbean, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Other members of the G.W. Bush administration have publicly shown their lack of 
interest in the Kyoto Treaty: “no, we have no interest in implementing that [Kyoto] 
treaty.”191 
In the 2000 presidential campaign, there was a division of position regarding the 
environment. Democrats believed that tackling global warming was not costly, while 
Republicans believed it would be enormously costly. For example, the G.W. Bush 
administration argued that “in ruling out a plan to impose restrictions on power plants’ 
emissions of carbon dioxide, […] it is said such a step would be too costly to the 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 The Royal Society, “The Science of Climate Change,” available at 
http://royalsociety.org/Report_WF.aspx?pageid=10028. 
190 Ibid. 
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economy and to American consumers.”192 Therefore, on the American side, there was a 
strong reluctance to impose rapid and severe cuts on energy consumption, especially by 
individual consumers.193 
During the 2000 campaign, Bush showed some interest in the environment, but 
most likely only in order to gain votes. Once in office, Bush publicly mentioned that his 
campaign proposal had been in error, since CO2 was not a “pollutant”194 according to the 
1970 Clean Air Act.195 He also referred to a December 2000 study by the Department of 
Energy, which, in his words, concluded that “caps on carbon dioxide emissions as part of 
a multiple emissions strategy would lead to an even more dramatic shift from coal to 
natural gas for electric power generation and significantly higher electricity prices.”196 
These caps were a concern, he wrote, particularly in the West [of the U.S.]: “At a time 
when California has already experienced energy shortages, and other Western states are 
worried about price and availability of energy this summer, we must be very careful not 
to take actions that could harm consumers.”197 Yet, as Elizabeth Shogren of the Los 
Angeles Times immediately pointed out, California is “much less dependent on coal for 
                                                                                                                                                 
191 Christine Todd Whitman, administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, discussing the U.S. 
Administration’s decision to reject the Kyoto Treaty, in Europe, Europe Update, April 2001, Volume IX, 
Number 4. 
192 See Jehl, D., “U.S. Rebuffs European Plea Not to Abandon Climate Pact” The New York Times, April 4, 
2001, p. A 16. 
193 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 11. 
194 Others share President G.W. Bush’s view that CO2 is not a pollutant, but a necessity. See “Carbon 
Dioxide is Our Friend,” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0_VmMIbWKoo; see also “Global 
Warming – ‘Glaciers,” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wq_Bj-av3g0.  
195 U.S. Code, Title 42, Chapter 85. 
196 See Office of the Press, “Text of a Letter from the President to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and 
Roberts,” The White House, which is a response letter dated 13 March 2001 from the U.S. President to 
Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts to their letter of 6 March 2001, asking for the Administration’s 
views on global climate change, in particular the Kyoto Protocol, and efforts to regulate carbon dioxide 
under the Clean Air Act. 
197 Ibid. 
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power than most of the country,”198 with only about one-eighth of its power coming from 
coal-fired plants. Moreover, in a New York Times article published on April 4, 2001, it 
was noted that U.S. administration officials had restated “a view that the 1997 treaty was 
unfair to the United States and that it was not worthy of American support.”199 
 
4.1.1. Arguments for Rejecting Kyoto 
In 1997 the U.S. Senate approved by a vote of 95-0 the Byrd-Hagel resolution,200 which 
urged the administration not to agree to a treaty that: 1) does not include developing 
countries (especially China) and 2) harms the U.S. economy.201 Since according to the 
U.S. Constitution, two thirds of the U.S. Senate (i.e., 67 votes) are needed for the 
ratification of a treaty,202 Kyoto’s ratification by the U.S. is far from becoming a reality. 
For years after the Byrd-Hagel resolution, President Clinton would frequently say: 
“Kyoto was the only bill I lost before I sent it to the Congress.”203 
On what grounds was the U.S. Senate arguing, and continues to argue, the first 
point (i.e., not to agree to a climate change treaty that does not include developing 
countries)? According to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, since 2007 
                                                 
198 Shogren, E. “Bush Drops Pledge to Curb Emissions,” Los Angeles Times, 14 March 2001, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/14/news/mn-37556. 
199 See Jehl, D., “U.S. Rebuffs European Plea Not to Abandon Climate Pact” The New York Times, April 4, 
2001, p. A 16. 
200 S. Res. 98, 105th Congress, 1997. 
201 See Cohen, B. R., “Next Round in the Climate Debate,” in The Earth Times, October 30, 2000, pp. 10-
15, at. 14. 
202 Article II, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution. 
203 On U.S. climate change policy under President Clinton, see McGee, J. & Taplin, R. “The Asia-Pacific 
Partnership and the United States’ International Climate Change Policy,” 19 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y, 179 (2008); Peterson, T. “The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States: 
Lessons Learned and New Directions,” 14 Widener L.J., 81 (2004); Royden, A. “U.S. Climate Change 
Policy Under President Clinton: A Look Back,” 32 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., 415 (2002); Thackeray, R. 
“Struggling for Air: The Kyoto Protocol, Citizens’ Suits Under the Clean Air Act, and the United States’ 
Options for Addressing Global Climate Change,” 14 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev., 855 (2004). 
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China has been the largest producer of CO2 in the world.204 Since global warming is a 
long-term problem, China has to commit. Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing 
countries have no binding obligation, giving them a competitive advantage in marketing 
any product where energy costs are a key aspect to its manufacture. The U.S. Senate 
would ultimately reject any climate change treaty that does not include meaningful 
participation by developing countries. 
Since the 2009 COP-15 in Copenhagen resulted in an Accord which resembles a 
pledge-and-review system, most observers now doubt that a framework built on 
emissions targets and timetables, as is the case of the Kyoto Protocol, is politically viable 
at all in the foreseeable future. A key issue is whether a pledge-and-review system 
suffices, at least for the time being. Will progress on the numbers (i.e., GHG emission 
rates or emission intensity) actually occur? If not, what other approach is feasible now or 
in the foreseeable future? 
The climate change problem cannot be solved without developing country 
participation, but the industrialized countries have greater resources than most developing 
countries when it comes to tackling climate change. In the view of many people, as the 
biggest GHG polluters to date, the developed countries also have a moral obligation to 
act first. However, China is the major GHG emitting country since 2007, so its position 
as leader of a historically hurt G-77 is no longer credible. 
As for the second point (i.e., not to agree to a climate change treaty that harms the 
U.S. economy), the G.W. Bush administration argued that the overall cost of the Kyoto 
Protocol to the U.S. economy would simply be too high. Moreover, West Virginia, 
                                                 
204 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, “Global CO2 emissions: increase continued in 2007,” 
  Dr Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
 63
among other states, opposed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol because West Virginia 
mainly produces coal. The same argument is used by Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf 
countries which are heavily reliant on the oil industry. Consumption of both coal and oil 
produces CO2. Incidentally, Saudi Arabia is the only country to openly doubt the reality 
of human-caused climate change. Instead of ratification, G.W. Bush’s national policy was 
to slightly slow the growth of GHG emissions by encouraging voluntary efficiency 
improvements by individuals and industries. It has also supported subsidies and 
cooperative agreements for development of new low-carbon technologies. At other times, 
the G.W. Bush administration proposed adaptation as the only sensible climate policy. It 
is somewhat ironic that the Bush policy actually worked, not on its own, but because of 
the unanticipated steep rise in energy prices after 2001. The 2008 economic collapse 
further suppressed emissions. 
Even under Barack Obama’s administration, the U.S. seems far from being 
committed to the Kyoto Protocol.205 Although at first it seemed that the Obama 
administration was committed to, and displayed great enthusiasm for, the global 
negotiations on climate change,206 there is not much difference with G.W. Bush’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 June 2008, available at http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2008/GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007.html. 
205 For an analysis of U.S. climate policy under President Obama, see Adams M. Working With 
Government Agencies In Climate Change Law, Aspatore, 2009; Battista, G. “The Obama Climate Change 
and Energy Agenda: Bad Timing for a Renaissance,” 16(5) Envtl. Liability, 167 (2002); Camacho, A. 
“Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure,” 59 
Emory L.J., 1 (2009); Hunter, D. “International Climate Negotiations: Opportunities And Challenges For 
The Obama Administration”, 19 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F., 247 (2009); Martella, R. “Climate Change 
Along the Northeast Corridor: How Washington and New York are Approaching and Preparing for 
Greenhouse Gas Controls,” 18 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J., 14 (2010); Miller, N. et al. “Policy, Urban Form, and 
Tools for Measuring and Managing Greenhouse Gas Emissions: The North American Problem,” 80 U. 
Colo. L. Rev., 977 (2009); Westmoreland, J. “Global Warming and Originalism: The Role of the EPA in the 
Obama Administration,” 37 EB.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev., 225 (2010). 
206 See the views of President Obama at a primary-campaign victory speech in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 
favour of climate change. Lizza, R. “As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White House missed 
their best chance to deal with climate change,” The New Yorker, 11 October 2010. 
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administration.207 Political developments in the U.S. have disillusioned this ambition. For 
example, Congressional proposals for a domestic cap‐and‐trade regime for emissions 
limitations have failed. It is also interesting to note that, in May 1998, the Illinois General 
Assembly passed a bill condemning the Kyoto Protocol and forbidding state efforts to 
regulate greenhouse gases. The then state legislator Barack Obama voted for the bill.208 
That said, it was just a resolution, so even though it passed, it had no legal effect. The 
chart below shows the fact that climate change was not a top policy priority for the 
Obama administration in 2011: 
                                                 
207 Thernstrom, S. “The Quiet Death of the Kyoto Protocol,” The American, 5 November 2009, available at 
http://www.american.com/archive/2009/november/the-quiet-yet-historic-death-of-the-kyoto-protoco. 
208 Ninetieth General Assembly of the State of Illinois, House Joint Resolution No. 48, 22 May 1998, p. 
4313.  
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In fact, dealing with global warming as a top priority for the U.S. President and 
Congress has been getting worse over the years since 2007, as the next chart clearly 
illustrates: 
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To that can be added that, since 2008, Americans seem to be less worried about 
the threat of global warming, less convinced that its effects are already happening, and 
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are less sure that scientists themselves are certain about its occurrence.209 Even some U.S. 
policymakers deny that global warming is anthropogenic.210 
If our aim is to move the world economy entirely away from fossil fuels, we 
would need to increase funding for research to find alternatives. Until we get there, we 
can gradually raise the efficiency of fossil-fuel consumption. The problem is that most of 
the technologies that use fossil fuels are long-lived (for example, the stock of automobiles 
has a lifetime of about two decades). This implies that even with clear policy signals to 
control emissions, manufacturers and consumers have only limited leverage over 
emissions in the short term. The U.S. Climate Change Adaptation Task Force released an 
interagency report in October 2010 outlining recommendations to President Obama for 
how federal agency policies and programs can better prepare the U.S. to respond to the 
impacts of climate change.211 
 
4.1.2. What Should the U.S. be Aiming at? 
The U.S. has long insisted that the most cost-effective way to reduce global emissions of 
greenhouse gases is through an international regime of emissions trading.212 The Clinton 
administration had already said that it wanted explicit rules on international trading of 
emissions permits before ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, but the trading rules remain 
                                                 
209 Newport, F. “Americans’ Global Warming Concerns Continue to Drop,” Gallup, 11 March 2010, 
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/126560/americans-global-warming-concerns-continue-drop.aspx. 
210 CBSNews, “New House Energy Chair: Global Warming Not Man-Made,” 9 February 2011, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-501465_162-20031180-501465.html. 
211 The White House Council on Environmental Quality, “Progress Report of the Interagency Climate 
Change Adaptation Task Force: Recommended Actions in Support of a National Climate Change 
Adaptation Strategy,” 5 October 2010. 
212 For views of the U.S. government energy and climate change programs, see Brewer, T. “U.S. 
Government Policymaking on Climate Change: Recent Developments, Transitions, and Prospects for the 
Future,” Oxford Energy and Environment Comment, October 2010; Eizenstat, S. “The U.S. Role in Solving 
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unclear.213 Since Kyoto stipulates that emissions trading will be limited only to Annex I 
countries,214 the U.S. should try to renegotiate this limitation to expand it to trading 
emissions with developing countries.215 
The U.S. (and other developed regions of the world for this matter) should be 
willing to cooperate in technology transfer for the benefit of the environment globally. In 
fact, the U.S. assumption during the Kyoto negotiations was that technology transfer 
from developed to developing countries could solve global warming and would also help 
the U.S. have a greater market access to developing countries. As shown in the chart 
below, the contribution to GHG increase by 2025 coming from industrialized countries 
will be relatively modest, compared to that projected in developing countries. If we 
believe that in years to come developing countries will be causing greater environmental 
damage than the developed world,216 then this argument of environmental technology 
transfer makes perfect sense. While at a global level, it would be unfair to place the same 
burden on developing countries as on developed countries, they must at least make a 
minimum of contribution. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Climate Change: Green Growth Policies Can Enable Leadership Despite the Economic Downturn,” Energy 
Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1-9. 
213 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 12. 
214 Annex I of the UNFCCC refers to developed countries and countries that are undergoing the process of 
transition to a market economy. 
215 Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
216 Indeed, since 2007 China is the largest emitter of CO2 in the world. It is predicted that other major 
developing countries will increase their GHG emissions in the near future. 
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All this said, two steps need to be distinguished. First, U.S. environmental policy 
is still hindered by the important economic consequences at stake. The U.S. 
administration cannot ignore the economic interests linked to the soundness of the oil 
market, major firms rely on it, and a slowdown in their activity could hinder the U.S. 
economic growth.217 It makes it extremely difficult to pass an environmental bill through 
Congress. Second, the non-binding Copenhagen Accord, wished by the American 
President, acts as a compromise between flexibility ordered by the industry and the 
politically incorrect refusal of environmental policy changes. 
On the domestic U.S. front, the Obama administration seems committed to 
implementing regulations on large GHG sources through its Clean Air Act authority 
(although how far it can go without causing a Congressional backlash is unclear), and it 
                                                 
217 In his book America’s Climate Problem, Robert Repetto proposes a national policy for the U.S. that can 
reduce GHG emissions and can bring about a transition to clean energy sources, while preserving healthy 
economic growth and high standards of living. Repetto addresses the controversial issue of fundraising as a 
root cause of the U.S. Congress’s failure to enact policies that set a price on carbon—even when the EU, 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, several Canadian provinces, and even many U.S. State governments have 
done so. See Repetto, R. America’s Climate Problem: The Way Forward, London: Earthscan, 2011. 
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has already tightened fuel economy standards across the motor vehicle fleet at the federal 
level. At the state and local level, greenhouse reduction plans are being implemented to 
cap or reduce emissions. In California, implementation of recent legislation to reduce 
GHG emissions from motor vehicles and other sources is providing a test case of the 
legal and political ability of states moving ahead without the federal government. Success 
in California would provide some impetus to federal legislation (assuming costs of 
implementation are modest) as other states perhaps may do the same and the industry 
may look to U.S. Congress for national uniformity. Previous examples of legislative 
success at the state level, which eventually turned into federal legislation, are urban air 
pollution, leading to the federal Clean Air Act of 1970, and acid rain, leading to the 1990 
amendments.218 
Several large companies such as General Electric and British Petroleum have 
made specific commitments over time to cut emissions in a way roughly consistent with 
the Kyoto obligations. For the first time, in 2010 several large firms publicly endorsed an 
emission cap via the United States Climate Action Partnership.219 One reason was their 
anticipation of ultimate CO2 regulation and the competitive advantage that may reside in 
making appropriate investment decisions well in advance. Another was the opportunity to 
coordinate international operations because some companies will come under Kyoto’s 
strictures through their foreign operations and will be participating in Kyoto’s emissions 
                                                 
218 Section 812 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
to develop periodic reports that estimate the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act. For a cost-benefit 
analysis on the Clean Air Act between 1990 and 2020, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office 
of Air and Radiation, “The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020,” March 2011. 
219 The “United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP) is a group of business and leading 
environmental organizations that have come together to call on the federal government to quickly enact 
strong national legislation to require significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.” For further 
information, see http://www.us-cap.org/. 
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trading market. A third reason was green image-making with the public. These 
motivations remain in place. 
 
4.1.3. Consequences of the U.S. Position for Foreign Affairs 
The current situation is making the Trans-Atlantic relationship difficult. The issue of 
climate change has become a foreign policy problem for the U.S. The G.W. Bush 
administration gradually understood that “this is about international relations as well, and 
other countries are reacting very strongly against the U.S.”220 
 
4.2. Chinese Position 
Climate change will have a significant impact on China.221 The size and rate of growth of 
China’s economy, of its energy demand, of its energy imports, and of its atmospheric 
emissions of various types make this country an essential major partner in any regional or 
global discussions relating to climate change or the production and consumption of 
                                                 
220 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 12. 
221 On the impact of climate change on China, see Gang, F. et al. (eds.), The Economics of Climate Change 
in China: Towards a Low Carbon Economy, Earthscan 2010; Jiang, N. & Chua, J. “Clean Development 
Mechanism in China,” 21 J. Int'l Bank. L. & Reg., 569 (2006); Jie, Y. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Mitigation Measures in China,” in Stewart, R. et al. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding 
Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development, NYU Press, 2009; Khoday, K. “Mobilizing 
Market Forces to Combat Global Environmental Change: Lessons from UN-Private Sector Partnerships 
in China,” 16(2) Rev. Euro. Comm. & Int'l Envtl. L., 173 (2007); Kim, M. & Jones, R. “China’s Energy 
Security and the Climate Change Conundrum,” 19(3) Nat. Resources & Envt., 3 (2005); Kim, M. & Jones, 
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Climate Change Policy,” 19 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, 179 (2008); Sunstein, C. “The World vs. the 
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Emitters,” 55 UCLA L. Rev., 1675 (2008); Vandenbergh, M. “Climate Change: The China Problem,” 81 S. 
Cal. L. Rev., 905 (2008); Wiener, J. “Climate Change Policy and Policy Change in China,” 55 UCLA L. 
Rev., 1805 (2008); Zang, D. “From Environment to Energy: China’s Reconceptualization of Climate 
Change,” 27 Wis. Int'l L.J., 483 (2009); Zang, D. “Green from Above: Climate Change, New 
Developmental Strategy, and Regulatory Choice in China,” 45 Tex. Int'l L.J., 201 (2009). 
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energy.222 China, a natural leader among developing countries, puts forward its counter-
argument to the U.S. position, that is, that even if it is the largest producer of GHG 
emissions in cumulative terms since 2007, its per capita GHG emissions were only about 
25 per cent of U.S. levels as of 2006223 (see chart below regarding per capita CO2 
emissions). Notwithstanding this, China is recently questioning statistics published by the 
International Energy Agency, which is especially shocking given the unreliability of 
many of the statistical indicators published by the Chinese government.224 
 
Source: Mongabay.com 
China’s position, therefore, is that global climate change must be addressed 
principally by wealthy industrial nations, which have not only the wealth and technology 
to provide solutions, but also the moral responsibility to do so because they have 
produced perhaps as much as 80 per cent of the GHG emissions to date, as shown in the 
                                                 
222 Hallding, K. & Olsson, M. “Balancing climate concerns and energy security: China searching for a new 
development pathway,” Stockholm Environment Institute Policy Brief, 2010. 
223 For an overview of carbon dioxide (i.e., the main greenhouse gas) emissions of the top-20 countries in 
the world in 2006, see Netherlands Environment Agency, http://www.pbl.nl/images/Top20-CO2andGHG-
countries-in2006-2005(GB)_tcm61-36276.xls. 
224 http://www.e360.yale.edu/content/digest.msp?id=2511. 
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chart below.225 China’s refusal to agree to an internationally binding emissions target is 
commonly cited in the U.S. as an argument against U.S. legislative action. 
  
Source: World Resources Institute 
If the Kyoto commitment is not enough to solve the problem, developed countries 
should do more about GHG emission reductions before they ask developing nations for 
commitment. Large developing countries—such as China, India, and Brazil—will not 
commit internationally to material reductions in their emissions in the absence of some 
comparable commitment by, say, the U.S. Conversely, the U.S. has not participated in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and will not agree to mandatory emission reductions targets due to 
                                                 
225 For a comparison of carbon dioxide emissions of the top-20 countries in the world in 2006 and a ranking 
of their per capita emissions, see Netherlands Environment Agency, http://www.pbl.nl/images/Top20-
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concerns about a loss of competitive advantage, relative to developing countries that are 
not subject to the same obligations. 
This is a circular argument: what comes first, the chicken or the egg? The U.S. is 
not willing to ratify an international multilateral environmental agreement on GHG 
emission reduction unless and until developing countries (especially China) are on board. 
On the other hand, China will only agree to being on board if the U.S. complies with the 
Kyoto Protocol first.226 As can be seen in the chart below, the Chinese argument seems 
pertinent in view of the projected per capita CO2 emissions for major emitters by 2030: 
Per Capita CO2 Emissions For Select Major Emitters, 2007 and 2030 (Projected) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
CO2andGHG-countries-in2006-2005(GB)_tcm61-36276.xls. 
226 A large part of the relevant legal literature suggests that the main polluting nations can be held 
responsible under international law for the harmful effects of their greenhouse-gas emissions. As a result, 
affected countries may have a substantive right to demand the cessation of a certain amount of emissions. 
In some cases, they also have the procedural means to pursue intergovernmental litigation in an 
international judicial forum such as the International Court of Justice. Developing countries are 
understandably reluctant to challenge any of the big donor nations in an international court. For a possible 
legal argument for such a lawsuit and some observations on the potential impacts of bringing a case before 
an international court, see Schwarte, C. & Byrne, R. “International Climate Change Litigation and the 
Negotiation Process,” Oil, Gas & Energy, November 2010. 
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Source: World Resources Institute 
Regardless of what the U.S. Congress does or does not legislate in climate change 
issues, with EU emissions probably having peaked and U.S. emissions possibly having 
done so as well, at least for the foreseeable future, the fate of Article 2 of the UNFCCC227 
more and more resides in the actions of China, Brazil, India, and the other large 
developing country emitters. Conceivably, the U.S. would eventually accept a Kyoto-like 
approach if means could be found to involve developing countries with specific 
obligations. However, the politics of negotiating subsequent steps and a long-term target 
for GHG emission reduction are full of difficulty as was obvious at the 2009 COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, where the U.S. and the EU accused China of forcefully obstructing progress 
in the climate change negotiations. One wonders why China is so vehemently opposed to 
legally binding commitments under a strong multilateral climate regime and to 
international checks to verify that it is on track to slow down GHG emissions. Not only 
are developing countries unlikely to assume binding obligations until industrialized 
countries have actually met some initial targets, but their potential assumption of 
obligations would raise the difficult question of equity.228 With per capita CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels in the U.S. about 4 times those of China and 20 times of India, questions 
of equity loom large when long-term limits are considered. 
                                                 
227 Article 2 of the UNFCCC stipulates that: 
 
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the 
Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and 
to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
228 For a proposal of differentiated obligations among the UNFCCC parties regarding mitigation, 
adaptation, and financial commitments, see Ott, H. et al. “South-North Dialogue on Equity in the 
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Nevertheless, limited progress on this issue has occurred. Starting with the COP-
13 in Bali in 2007 and culminating at the 2010 COP-16 in Cancún, developing countries 
enthusiastically embraced a plan for voluntary accession to limits and reduction crediting 
in the forest sector (the so-called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation [REDD] program), predicated, however, on financial support from 
developed countries. 
At the same time, developing countries are watching this environmental 
negotiating process to ensure that it helps them cope with climate change without 
threatening their hopes of economic growth.229 Officials are beginning to consider the 
possibility that a world climate change agreement might not be merely a crude attempt to 
cut off their economic growth, but rather a possible source of help in dealing with the air 
pollution that is emerging as a major threat to public health.230 The ideal situation would 
be to have both developing nations on board and the U.S. Senate ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is currently unrealistic. We need to find a compromise. 
Rich countries generally favor the creation of a new climate pact to succeed the 
Kyoto Protocol, placing more responsibility on key developing country emitters such as 
China and India, whereas developing countries continue to favor an approach that would 
implement a second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows them to opt out of 
emissions reductions if these pose a threat to development.231 In fact, the Chinese 
authorities have emphasized that the key to success in climate negotiations lies in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greenhouse: A Proposal for an Adequate and Equitable Global Climate Agreement,” Eschborn: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, 2004. 
229 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 11. 
230 Ibid., at p. 13. 
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commitments by rich countries to slash emissions and boost funding to developing 
countries in the form of aid and the promotion of clean technology.232 China has concerns 
over emissions commitments because it expects GHG emissions levels to continue rising 
for some time. In fact, over the past decade, China’s GHG emissions have more than 
doubled.233 This means that the EU’s proposal to raise the bloc’s target for cutting CO2 
emissions would have a limited impact on global warming, given that any benefit would 
be easily offset by China’s rise in GHG emissions.234 
However, since the 2010 COP-16 in Cancún, China’s attitude to combat climate 
change has been remarkable, by taking increasingly strong action to improve its energy 
efficiency, at both the national and sub-national level. For example, China has set a 2020 
carbon intensity target as part of its national policy and is taking aggressive steps to 
implement it. Moreover, China has prepared a five-year plan (2011-2015) that is the 
clearest indication of its determination to become a clean-energy powerhouse.235 This 
five-year plan puts emphasis on economic and industrial restructuring towards a greener, 
more efficient, and lower carbon economy. As part of this five-year plan, China is also 
developing regional domestic carbon trading programs and is also experimenting with 
emissions taxes. 
Climate change is one of the key drivers for China’s fundamental shift. 
Investment in clean energy in China rose 30 per cent in 2010, to US$51.1 billion—by far 
                                                                                                                                                 
231 ICTSD, “China Stands on Unconditional Climate Funding ahead of Cancún Talks,” Bridges Trade, Vol. 
10, No. 1, 22 November 2010. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Gallagher, K. “China Needs Help with Climate Change,” Current History, pp. 389-394, November 2007 
(stating that the growth rate of GHGs in China has been breathtaking). 
  Dr Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
 78
the largest figure for a single country—and represented more than 20 per cent of the total 
global investment of US$243 billion, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance.236 
China’s climate policy is largely motivated by factors other than concern about global 
warming, including energy security, the need to reduce local and regional atmospheric 
pollution from coal combustion that has caused serious health problems, and international 
competitiveness.237 It has pushed development of renewable energy technology to 
become the market leader in production of wind and solar technology, and adopted 
aggressive fuel economy standards for motor vehicles. 
However, China has been, and would like to continue as, the de facto leader of the 
G-77 group of developing countries, which is the UNFCCC/KP negotiating bloc for most 
developing countries. Accordingly, it would prefer not to take steps that would alienate 
other developing countries and jeopardize its role, unless there are very large 
compensating economic or other gains to be had. At the same time, China is also a 
member of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to 
coordinate climate and energy policies. Furthermore, China’s interests, like those of 
Brazil and a few other developing countries, no longer align with the G-77 very well 
since some of these major developing countries are among the largest GHG polluters in 
the world today. Moreover, China is not only the largest GHG emitter, but the leading 
                                                                                                                                                 
235 Wei, S. & Mabey, N. “Chinese Challenge or Low Carbon Opportunity? The Implications of China’s 12th 
Five-Year-Plan for Europe,” E3G Briefing, January 2011, available at http://greengrowthleaders.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/E3G_Chinese_Challenge_or_Low_Carbon_Opportunity1.pdf. 
236 Kanter, J. “China, Once Suspect on Emissions, Is Rapidly Becoming a Clean-Energy Power,” The New 
York Times, 26 January 2011, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D05E0DF113EF935A15752C0A9679D8B63. 
237 Indeed, China’s environment minister issued in 2011 an unusually stark warning about the effects of 
unbridled development on China’s air and soil, arguing that the nation’s current path could stifle long-term 
economic growth and feed social instability. See Jacobs, A. “China Issues Warning on Climate and 
Growth,” The New York Times, 28 February 2011. 
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producer of wind turbines and solar panels. How will this aggressive move into 
renewable energy markets affect its climate positioning versus other countries? 
 
4.3. European Union Position 
The European Union has long held a leadership position on climate change and has some 
of the strongest domestic support to address climate change.238 Moreover, the EU has 
been a firm supporter of the Kyoto Agreement,239 and it has been among the foreign 
                                                 
238 See, for instance, Oberthür, S. & Pallemaerts, M. (eds.) The New Climate Policies of the European 
Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy, Brussels: Brussels University Press, 2010; Dupont, C. 
“Political Commitment to Climate Policy Integration at EU Level: The Case of Biodiversity Policy,” 
Edinburgh Europa Paper Series, 2010/05, 2010; Wurzel, R. & Conelly, J. The European Union as a 
Leader in International Climate Change Politics, Routledge, 2010. 
239 There is a very rich literature on the EU’s position regarding climate change. See for instance Droege, S. 
“Climate Policy and Economic Bust: The European Challenges to Create Green Stimulus,” 2 Carbon & 
Climate L. Rev., 135 (2009); Bluemel, E. “Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive 
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good,” 155 U. Pa. L. Rev., 1981 (2007); Boeters, S. et al. 
Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenarios, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2007; Bugge, H. 
“Meeting the Kyoto Challenge: The Case of Norway,” 5 Int'l Energy L. & Tax. Rev., 140 (2006); Carlane, 
C. Climate Change Law & Policy: EU and US Perspectives, Oxford University Press 2010; Cass, L. The 
Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Norms, Domestic Policies, and 
Unachievable Commitments, State University of New York Press, 2006; Chapman, J. “The EU ETS: 
Experience to Date and Lessons for the Future in Stewart, R. et al. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and 
Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global Development, NYU Press, 2009; Del Guayo, I. “The 
Implementation of the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol in Spain,” 4 Int'l Energy L. & Tax. Rev., 
114 (2006); Derwent, H. “Carbon Market Design: Beyond the EU Emissions Trading Scheme” in Stewart, 
R. et al. (eds.), Climate Finance: Regulatory and Funding Strategies for Climate Change and Global 
Development, NYU Press, 2009; Dowden, M. Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Law, Policy 
& Practice, EG Books, 2008; Douma, W. et al (eds.), The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal and Policy 
Challenges of Climate Change, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007; Ferjentsik, V. & Ash, M. “An EU Sky 
Trust: Can a Lower-Income Country Afford Climate Policy?” 16(5) Envtl. Liability, 183 (2008); Glienke, 
N. “External Reporting of the Risks Linked to the EU ETS – an Exploratory Study of German HDAX Non-
Financial Corporations,” 2 Carbon & Climate L. Rev., 143 (2009); Grobbel, M. Implementing Climate 
CHange Measures in the EU: Key Success Factors, Wiesbaden, 2009; Harris, P. “The European Union and 
Environmental Change, Sharing the Burdens of Global Warming,” 17 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y, 309 
(2006); Hedemann-Robinson, M. “Climate Change Policy: EU and International Developments,” 14 Envtl. 
Liab. CS1 (2006); Hilson, C. “Going Local? EU Law, Localism and Climate Change,” 33(2) Euro. L. Rev., 
194 (2008); Hobday, S. “The Energy Review: Balancing Climate Change with the United Kingdom's 
Energy Security Challenge,” 7 Int'l Energy & Tax. Rev., 195 (2006); Kearny, T. “Market-based policies for 
demand side energy efficiency: A comparison of the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme and the United Kingdom's Energy Efficiency Commitment,” 23(2) Envtl. & Plan. L.J., 113 (2006); 
Kunzlik, P. “The Procurement of ‘Green’ Energy,” in Arrowsmith, S. & Kunzlik, P. (eds.) Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009; Nanda, V. “The European Union's Multinational Carbon Trading Program,” 85 
Denv. U. L. Rev., 995 (2007-2008); Park, P. “The Implementation of the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto 
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voices to react to former President G.W. Bush’s decision to abandon the treaty. Its 
objective (and that of its then 15 Member States) was to ratify Kyoto and have it in force 
by 2002 at the latest, which only happened in 2005.240 In an encounter between officials 
of the EU and the U.S. in Washington in early April 2001, European officials clearly said 
they were going to continue with the Kyoto process, even if the U.S. was absent. In fact, 
some Europeans saw the COP-6 at The Hague as an opportunity for European 
governments to show leadership and initiative.241 Among Europeans, there is a profound 
mistrust of the market mechanisms that the Americans propose in order to reduce the cost 
and impact of reductions.242 On the other hand, the American view is that the European 
intransigence of asking parties to the Kyoto Protocol to accept Kyoto’s commitments as 
they stand has killed the Kyoto Protocol because the current situation is unacceptable to 
the U.S. 
 In response to former President G.W. Bush’s decision to avoid his responsibility 
vis-à-vis the environment, former European Commission President Romano Prodi said to 
La Repubblica newspaper that “if one wants to be a world leader, one must know how to 
look after the entire Earth and not only American industry.”243 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protocol in the United Kingdom,” 6 Int'l Energy L. & Tax. Rev., 156 (2006); Peeters, M. & Deketelaere, K. 
EU Climate Change Policy: The Challenge Of New Regulatory Initiatives, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006; 
Pielow, J. & Luder, S. “Kyoto Developments in Germany: Emissions Trading, 6 Int'l Energy L. & Tax. 
Rev., 163 (2006); Robinson, J. Climate Change Law: Emissions Trading in the EU and the UK, London: 
Cameron May, 2007; Stallworthy, M. “Sustainability, the Environment, and the Role of UK Corporations,” 
17(6) Int'l Company & Comm. L. Rev., 155 (2006). 
240 See Interview given to Margot Wallström, former European Environment Commissioner, in Europe, 
The Green Issue, published by the Delegation of the European Commission to the U.S., February 2001, pp. 
14-15, at 15. 
241 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 13. 
242 Anderson, J.W., “Climate Change Diplomacy: The Next Step,” in Resources, Winter 2001, Issue 
Number 142, pp. 11-13, at 11. 
243 BBC News, “Europe backs Kyoto accord,” 31 March 2001, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1252556.stm. 
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Furthermore, Margot Wallström, former European Commissioner for the 
environment, reacting to a statement from the U.S. administration on their rejection of the 
Kyoto Protocol, said: “The U.S. position is extremely worrying. The U.S. must 
understand that this is not a marginal issue for the EU. It has implications for external 
relations including trade and economic affairs, and it cannot be played down.”244 Kjell 
Larsson, Sweden’s former environment minister, said in a statement following meetings 
with U.S. administration officials on Kyoto: “Climate change is happening now and is a 
serious threat to the future of mankind. We are prepared if necessary to go forward 
without the U.S. We cannot allow one country to declare as dead the process for 
addressing this major global issue. However, we still hope to have the United States 
involved in the protocol as soon as possible.”245 Also Gerhard Schröder, former 
chancellor of Germany, reacting to the U.S. administration’s decision to reject Kyoto, 
said: “Nobody should be relieved from his responsibility for climate control.”246 
 
4.3.1. EU Emissions Cuts 
Some people argue that in the EU there is much talk but little action concerning Kyoto. 
Even from a more technical view point, European finance and trade ministers are unlikely 
to let environmental ministers impose costly limits on emissions unless the U.S. is also on 
board. 
                                                 
244 See press release “Commission reacts to US statements on the Kyoto Protocol,” 29 March 2001, 
available at 
http://www.delcan.ec.europa.eu/en/press_and_information/press_releases/2001/01PR004.shtml. 
245 See Europe, Europe Update, April 2001, Volume IX, Number 4. 
246 Ibid. 
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However, a new report by the European Environment Agency (EEA) based on 
GHG emission data for 2008-2009 shows that large drop in emissions during 2008 and 
2009 gives the EU-15 a head start to reach and even over-achieve its 8 per cent reduction 
target under the Kyoto Protocol.247 The EEA report also shows that the EU-27 is well on 
track towards achieving its 20 per cent reduction target by 2020.248 Moreover, a report 
from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the EU Council shows 
the actual progress and determination in the EU to reduce emissions toward meeting the 
Kyoto target.249 
More recently, the EU has been arguing that emissions reduction is good for 
European business, thereby moving away from traditional reasons for deeper cuts in 
GHG emissions such as moral responsibility and survival of humankind.250 Furthermore, 
a 2011 analysis by the European Commission shows “that domestic emission reductions 
of the order of 40% and 60% below 1990 levels could be achieved in a cost-effective way 
by 2030 and 2040, respectively. This is illustrated in [the chart below]. Such a pathway 
would require an annual reduction compared to 1990 of approximately 1 percentage point 
in the first decade until 2020, 1.5 percentage points in the second until 2030, and 2 
percentage points in the last two decades until 2050. The effort would become greater 
                                                 
247 European Environment Agency, “Tracking Progress Towards Kyoto and 2020 Targets in Europe,” EEA 
Report, No. 7/2010, p. 30. 
248 Ibid., at pp. 31-2. 
249 European Commission, “Progress Towards Achieving the Kyoto Objectives,” COM(2010) 569 final, 12 
October 2010. 
250 See Chaffin, J. “EU warms to business of climate change,” Financial Times, 30 November 2010. 
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over time as a wider set of cost-effective technologies would become available.”251 This 
means that GHG emissions would be reduced by a further 5 per cent. 
 
EU GHG emissions towards an 80 per cent domestic reduction (100%=1990) 
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Source: European Commission 
However, the only sector where the EU’s GHG emissions continue to rise is in the 
transport sector. This may complicate the EU’s target to reduce its GHG emissions 
between 80 per cent and 95 per cent by 2050 compared to the 1990 levels,252 since 
transport is one of the largest energy-consuming sectors in the EU, accounting for one-
third of EU energy consumption. The chart below shows the projection of GHG 
emissions growth in the EU should things remain business as usual. 
                                                 
251 Communication from the European Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “A Roadmap for Moving to a Low 
Carbon Economy in 2050,” p. 4, 2011. 
252 See a study by Christian Egenhofer, “The EU should not shy away from setting CO2-related targets for 
transport,” Policy Brief No. 229/January 2011, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
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Projected EU GHG emissions growth: transport v. non-transport sector 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
4.3.2. EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)253 is the world’s most important GHG 
emissions trading scheme,254 with an estimated value of EUR 63 billion of the overall 
EUR 86 billion value of the global carbon market in 2008.255 Operational since 2005, the 
ETS’s goal is to cut emissions by one-fifth from 1990 levels by 2020. It is the flagship 
                                                 
253 Directive 2003/87/EC, in force since 25 October 2003. 
254 On the EU emissions trading scheme, see generally Morgera, E., Kulovesi, K. & Mun oz, M. “The EU’s 
Climate and Energy Package: Environmental Integration and International Dimensions,” Edinburgh 
Europa Paper Series, No. 2010/7, 2010; see also Egenhofer, C., Alessi, M., Georgiev, A. & Fujiwara, N. 
“The EU Emissions Trading System and Climate Policy towards 2050: Real incentives to reduce emissions 
and drive innovation?” Special Report, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011(which addresses the 
fundamental question of whether the ETS has lived up to its promise to “promote reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner”, and if not, what the prospects of its 
doing so are in the future and what additional changes will be required). 
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policy covering half of the EU’s carbon emissions,256 and could turn intended restrictions 
on pollution into a trap that commits the EU to increasing carbon emissions for much of 
the next decade, unless changes are swiftly introduced.257 
Both the Fourth Assessment Report by the IPCC and the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change make clear the point that a price for GHG emissions is one 
of the most effective ways to mitigate climate change.258 The ETS is on course to require 
savings of, at best, a miniscule quantity of 32 million tons of emissions between 2008 and 
2012, despite covering 12,000 installations and 1.9 billion tons of emissions annually.259 
Regulating a single power station over the same period could have had a greater 
impact.260 An already weak cap for this period became a severe over-allocation of 
pollution permits when the 2008 economic recession caused a sharp drop in production 
and therefore carbon emissions. These lower emissions, far from helping the EU towards 
a low carbon future, may actually trap it into continued high carbon economy because the 
ETS allows the huge volume of unused permits to be carried over into the next phase of 
                                                                                                                                                 
255 Capoor, K. & Ambrosi, P. “State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009,” Washington, D.C.: The 
World Bank, May 2009, pp. 1-2. 
256 On 20 December 2010, EU environment ministers agreed to bring Switzerland into the EU’s ETS. The 
ETS already includes other non-EU European countries such as Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland. See 
EurActiv, “Switzerland moves to join Europe’s carbon market,” available at http://bit.ly/ha7Mvu. 
257 See Sandbag, “Cap or Trap? How the EU ETS Risks Locking-in Carbon Emissions,” September 2010, 
available at http://sandbag.org.uk/files/sandbag.org.uk/caportrap.pdf. 
258 See “Summary for Policymakers,” in Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (eds.), Climate Change 2007: 
Synthesis Report, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 18; Stern, N. The Economics of Climate Change: 
The Stern Review, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 349. 
259 This estimated figure of 32 million tons saving over five years (2008-2012) assumes a rapid European 
economic recovery (to 2008 levels by 2011).  This means that even if the economy recovers quickly from 
the 2008 financial crisis, caps will only be 32 million tons lower than the actual emissions in that period. A 
slower recovery would mean that the caps stayed above the carbon emissions, providing no constraint on 
emissions. 
260 Drax power station in the UK is estimated to have a cap on emissions 60 metric tons below its emissions 
in Phase 2. Caps like those given to Drax add up to an overall cap for large power installations that would 
have led to 1.1 billion expected savings, a genuine cap on pollution that could have driven emissions 
reductions and clean energy investment. However, this has been all but cancelled out by extravagant free 
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the scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. These permits would then be available for 
companies as the economy picks up again from the 2008 economic recession, removing a 
key driver for investment in low carbon options. The ETS in its current form, although a 
very powerful and effective policy in principle, is in danger of actually hindering a low 
carbon economy for years to come.261 
There are a few ways to solve the ETS and avoid the carbon trap.262 These involve 
compensating for the fact that too many permits have been put into the system, and 
include the following points: 
1. increasing the EU carbon reduction target from 20 per cent to 30 per cent by 
2020. The EU has already achieved half of the existing target and a higher target 
would protect momentum towards low carbon future;263 
2. setting caps for the next trading phase (2013-2020) based upon actual emissions 
and not on the permits allocated, which were too many. This would require 
holding back 1.4 billion tons of permits from the scheme from the start, whilst a 
political decision is reached to cancel the permits permanently. This decision must 
be reached as quickly as possible; 
3. Amending the rules of the ETS (through a change in the directive264) to allow 
flexibility to respond to large drops in demand such as those caused by the 2008 
                                                                                                                                                 
allocations to heavy industry such as iron and steel, creating a billion more permits than are needed to cover 
their emissions. 
261 The volume of surplus permits in the trading scheme is now so high that the EU could increase 
emissions until as late as 2016 when they could reach almost a third higher than 2010 levels. 
262 See Ellerman, D. & Joskow, P. “The European Union’s Emission Trading System in Perspective,” Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change, 2008. 
263 For the specific case of the UK, see Skea, J., Ekins, P. and Winskel, M. (eds.) Energy 2050: Making the 
Transition to a Secure Low-Carbon Energy System, London: Earthscan, 2010 (which explores in detail the 
factors which could help or hinder the attainment of the UK’s climate change targets, and how these factors 
interact with the parallel objective of maintaining a robust and secure energy system). 
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economic recession, in order to prevent an inundation of permits undermining 
carbon savings. 
These measures face some stiff resistance. While too many permits have been handed out 
overall, this was not done evenly across those companies covered by the scheme. Some 
companies received a cap lower than their emissions, but others higher. A few of the 
latter received an enormous over-allocation of permits, making millions from their sale. 
These are the ‘carbon fat cats’, led by steel conglomerate ArcelorMittal, and a number of 
them are lobbying hard to keep the ETS broken.265 
Millions of EU citizens are working hard to reduce their carbon emissions, saving 
a ton here, half a ton there. The ETS covers 1.9 billion tons annually, including those 
from electricity production. To allow the ETS to fail, providing miniscule carbon savings 
and allowing some ‘carbon fat cats’ to make huge profits though over-allocated permits, 
would be a travesty.266 
Moreover, since the international negotiations for the creation of a global climate 
change agreement did not reach a conclusion in Copenhagen in 2009, the provisions of 
the Emissions Trading Directive on bilateral agreements have become more relevant than 
ever. International credits from projects or other emission-reducing activities in a third 
                                                                                                                                                 
264 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a 
scheme for GHG emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 
96/61/EU, OJ L275, 25 October 2003; this Directive has been amended most recently by Directive 
2009/29/EC, so as to improve and extend the GHG emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, 
OJ L140/63, 5 June 2009. 
265 The surplus permits held by the top 10 ‘carbon fat cats’ in 2009 nearly quadrupled, growing from 33 
million permits to 119 million. These would currently be worth roughly €1.7 billion if sold on the carbon 
market. ArcelorMittal is likely to accrue 102 million more permits than it needs. See Sandbag, “Cap or 
Trap? How the EU ETS Risks Locking-in Carbon Emissions,” September 2010, available at 
http://sandbag.org.uk/files/sandbag.org.uk/fatcats2009.pdf, pp. 35-42. 
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country are eligible for use in the EU ETS only if an agreement has been concluded 
between the EU and the respective third country.267 Furthermore, the Emissions Trading 
Directive also stipulates that once an international agreement on climate change has been 
reached, from 2013 onwards, international credits are disqualified from use within the EU 
ETS if these credits are generated from projects from third countries that have not ratified 
the said agreement.268 
 
5. Recommendations 
Given the lack of understanding at a global level, here are some recommendations for 
future international environmental fora: 
 
1. Environmental taxes. They are very common in the EU and very unpopular in the 
U.S. The idea is to penalize bad environmental performers by placing higher taxes on 
those actors whose GHG emissions are high and to give credit to good environmental 
performers in order to promote environmentally friendly behavior and create an incentive 
for alternative power generation from wind, sun, and water. The counterargument is that 
hydropower as well as wind and geothermal energy are clean but naturally limited. As for 
solar energy, it is useful at the moment only for small-scale applications because no 
practical system exists yet for storing it for use at night or in bad weather. Natural gas, 
more efficient at producing energy than coal, is currently in short supply.269  
                                                                                                                                                 
266 For an analysis of the ETS from the perspective of the principle of proportionality, see Holwerda, M. 
“Subsidizing Carbon Capture and Storage Demonstration through the EU ETS New Entrants Reserve: A 
Proportionality Test,” Carbon and Climate Law Review, No. 3/2010, pp. 228-239. 
267 Directive 2003/87/EC, Article 11a (5). 
268 Directive 2003/87/EC, Article 11a (7). 
269 See Richter, B., “Learning What Fuel To Burn,” The New York Times, Tuesday, April 17, 2001, p. A19. 
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 A global carbon tax is also a sensible recommendation. The idea behind it is a tax 
that would decrease the profits of users of carbon-based fuels and increase them for users 
of alternatives. In that same way, a tax on vehicles based on their fuel efficiency would 
help achieve the Kyoto goal. Expanded economic incentives, such as tax breaks, for the 
development of more efficient systems of all types, would help us move faster toward 
minimizing our dependence on carbon-based fuels.270 
However, it is not easy to ascertain the exact amount of a tax. An alternative 
solution is to trade emission rights within a certain cap amount of GHG emissions. Both 
methods are essentially the same, but with a different approach. That said, the question 
remains: which should be set first—the price (tax) or the quantity (GHG emission 
allowance)? The practice of each, however, is different and most people prefer the cap-
and-trade system because it creates markets that can link up and yield cost efficiency and 
positive scale and diversifying effects. Also, the cap-and-trade approach responds better 
to the business cycle than a tax would. Having said that, there are cases where, arguably, 
a tax would work better. 
2. Estimating environmental damage before making environmental policy. More and 
better environmental data are needed to create more efficient environmental policy that 
will slow down the rapid level of damage to the climate. However, this does not mean 
that no action should be taken until we have better data. 
3. Information instruments. There could be a requirement of mandatory reports from 
every industrial firm regarding GHG emissions which will be available to governments 
and the general public (by publishing it on the companies’ web sites). For example, if 
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General Motors (GM) has a poor record on GHG emissions in comparison with Volvo, 
this can be utilized as consumer market pressure, so that GM tries to reduce its GHG 
emissions. It is difficult, though, to know prima facie whether this proposal will be 
effective or how much of the work we can expect consumer-responses to do.  
It is also important to educate people to understand the seriousness of the 
problem. Consumers can then decide more objectively what product (cars, engines) to 
buy. 
4. Development of alternative technologies rather than a timetable approach. 
Kyoto’s decision was to opt for arbitrary short-term emissions targets, which has proven 
to be counterproductive. In market economies, governments do not control emissions 
directly, and thus it is extremely hard to set strict binding future targets. Instead of this 
particular timetable approach by 2008-2012, we could have non-binding targets or 
different timetables from the one in the Kyoto Protocol. We should also invest in 
developing efficient technologies, which is more interesting both to developing and 
developed countries. I am personally in favor of developing efficient technologies and 
also transferring them to developing countries. For example, a new technology that would 
filter out CO2 in cars. 
The attempts to create zero-emission vehicles are numerous. In California, for 
example, there is the 0 per cent emissions policy in cars. However, these attempts remain 
politically difficult.271 The first attempt was made by General Motors Company between 
                                                 
271 See Leal, W. (ed.) The Economic, Social and Political Elements of Climate Change, Berlin: Springer, 
2011 (dealing with the social, economic, and political aspects of climate change, exemplifying the diversity 
of approaches to climate change management taking place all over the world). 
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1996 and 1999 with the creation of a 100 per cent electric car named EV1.272 A few years 
later, all the models were removed for unclear reasons. Renault aims to release its first 
fully electric car in 2011.273 
One could argue that, even if the consumer’s reaction was perceived as positive, it 
appeared that this type of market would not be profitable for the car industry, removing 
the profitable maintenance of oil-based engines. The electric cars alternative274 consumes 
electric energy if this energy is obtained via combustion (of coal or oil),275 which causes 
CO2 emission and therefore does not solve the problem.276 
In 2004, Toyota created a gasoline-electric hybrid, which, while running, 
recharges its battery.277 This cuts the fuel consumption by half. Other cars burn hydrogen 
instead of gasoline. The hybrid models developed by Toyota are, however, not as 
effective as initially expected. Compared to the size of the cars and the normal 
                                                 
272 See “General Motors Friendly Vehicles,” available at 
http://198.208.187.166/about_gm/tech_center/friendly_vehicles.html. 
273 Renault, “The Electric Vehicle, A Global Strategy,” available at 
http://www.renault.com/en/capeco2/vehicule-electrique/pages/vehicule-electrique.aspx. 
274 For more information on electric cars, see “Electric Cars: A Sparky new Motor,” The Economist, 9 
October 2010, pp. 83-84; also, “Electric Cars: Highly Charged Motoring,” The Economist, 9 October 2010, 
pp. 18-21 (arguing that electric cars are neither as useful nor as green as their proponents claim). 
275 See the analysis by Gary Davis asking the question: what are their real environmental impacts when 
charging with electricity from power stations is taken into account? Davis, G. “Your new electric car emits 
75 gCO2/km (at the power station),” Ecometrica, 2011, available at 
http://d3u3pjcknor73l.cloudfront.net/assets/media/pdf/electric_car_emits_75_gCO2_per_km.pdf. 
276 However, according to research conducted by Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, 
electric cars hold greater promise for reducing emissions and lowering U.S. oil imports than a national 
renewable portfolio standard. The whole premise of the study is based on the assumption that power 
generation will come from gas, not coal. The published research can be found at 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/energy-forum/publications/energy-studies/energy-market-
consequences-of-an-emerging-u.s.-carbon-management-policy. 
277 Toyota Motor Corporation, “Toyota Prius Gasoline-Electric Hybrid Synergy Drive,” available at 
https://techinfo.toyota.com/techInfoPortal/staticcontent/en/techinfo/html/prelogin/docs/priusdisman.pdf. 
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consumption of such models, the actual CO2 emissions are very low (89g/km).278 
However, emissions remain greater than for some other smaller models. 
Another option is natural gas engines, which offer a better way to cut emissions 
because they are cheaper. Fiat is the market leader in Europe in natural-gas engines. 
Natural gas is a more affordable solution as it is less expensive to produce, transport, and 
distribute compared with other fuel sources. While Italy’s natural-gas vehicle market is 
one of the most robust in the world, the market is still in its infancy in the U.S. General 
Motors only began selling vehicles with natural-gas engines in the U.S. in 2010 for fleet 
buyers.279 
As economies grow, they consume more and more energy. Developed countries 
can help by offering developing countries support for greener energy technologies.280 We 
need, therefore, more R&D funding for alternative energy sources and for energy 
conservation. We need to move toward developing new, renewable energy sources, such 
as wind and solar energy.281 This is for the scientific community to develop. My 
suggestion is the use of more efficient power sources for transportation, carbon-free 
energy sources such as more advanced nuclear power plants and effective solar power 
systems. The U.S. Government needs to reverse course before more crucial time is lost. 
For that, we need effective political leadership in order to get us moving in the right 
direction. 
                                                 
278 Act on CO2, “New car CO2 emissions: Top 10 search,” available at 
http://actonco2.direct.gov.uk/home/what-you-can-do/On-the-move/Compare-car-CO2-emissions/top-10-
fuel-efficient-cars.html (select ‘All’ for ‘Class,’ ‘Gearbox,’ and ‘Fuel’). 
279 “Fiat Turns to Natural Gas for U.S. as Toyota, GM Go Electric,” Bloomberg, 2 December 2010. 
280 See for instance Lovins, A. “Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?” Foreign Affairs, October 1976. 
281 At the moment, countries may choose between clean energy or cheap energy, but not both. See “Clean 
and green, for a price,” The Economist, 11 December 2010, pp. 31-32. See also Delucchi, M. & Jacobson, 
M. “Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar power, Parts I and II,” Energy Policy, 2010. 
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The idea of making use of nuclear power poses problems such as safety, high 
cost, and waste. Most EU Member States, with the exception of the United Kingdom and 
France, are phasing out nuclear power. 
5. A two-speed Protocol on Climate Change with a dual timetable. As mentioned 
earlier under the section regarding the options we have under the current situation, the 
Kyoto Protocol failed. A solution could be an amended Kyoto Protocol282 with: 1) a 
longer time-frame for GHG emission reductions, 2) initially, a lower level of emission 
reduction with a gradual increase in GHG emissions reduction, and 3) a larger number of 
countries involved.  
The first point is the idea of a longer time-frame for GHG emission reductions 
whereby every ten years there will be a new target. In the chart below, I have arbitrarily 
assigned even years to industrialized nations (2020, 2030, 2040,…) and uneven years to 
developing nations (2015, 2025, 2035,…). This would create an important dynamic that 
would keep the international community engaged in an ongoing commitment to limit 
global warming. As for developing countries, the year by which to have them on board is 
2015, since by then major developing countries will be among the largest polluters of 
carbon dioxide in the world.283 The next reference year would be 2025, since by then the 
developing world will most likely have overtaken the developed world in producing 
carbon dioxide. From there, the commitment will be every ten years and targets will 
change. 
                                                 
282 Erik Haites and a team of researchers have also suggested an alternative to the Kyoto Protocol. See 
Haites, E. “The São Paulo Proposal for an Agreement on Future International Climate Policy,” in Douma, 
W., Massai, L. & Montini, M. (eds.) The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond: Legal and Policy Challenges of 
Climate Change, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2007, pp. 201-222. 
283 See the following chart regarding the projections for the world’s CO2 emissions by region from 1990 to 
2030, available at http://photos.mongabay.com/09/forecast_co2.jpg. 
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As for the second point, since the G.W. Bush administration claimed that part of 
the reason it did not agree with Kyoto was because achieving its goal would be 
economically painful and harmful to the U.S. economy, we propose in the chart below a 
50 per cent cut in the emission reductions currently required by Kyoto for industrialized 
nations. This means that the U.S. will have a reduction of 3.5 per cent instead of 7 per 
cent below 1990 levels, the EU will face a reduction of 4 per cent instead of 8 per cent 
below the 1990 levels, and Japan 3 per cent instead of 6 per cent below 1990 levels. 
Environmentally, this might not be the best solution (today the debate is to have a more 
ambitious GHG emissions reduction than that stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol, not the 
other way around), but it is better than throwing in the towel and, therefore, having to 
start from scratch. Once there has been a fifty per cent cut in the emission reductions 
from the original request in the Kyoto Protocol, we suggest a gradual increase in GHG 
emissions reduction every ten years until we reach 35 per cent below 1990 levels by year 
2050 in the case of developed nations.284 However, developing countries will not have a 
reduction of GHG emissions based on the 1990 levels, but on the 2000 levels. This means 
that the international community will take into account the more difficult situation in 
which developing countries find themselves and will ask them to start from the 2000 
levels and reach a gradual reduction below the 2000 levels, starting with 1 per cent below 
the 2000 levels by the year 2015 to reach 25 per cent below the 2000 levels by the year 
2045 in the specific case of China. 
With regard to the third point, we believe in the importance of also having 
developing countries on board since this is a global issue. However, being aware of the 
                                                 
284 For a study of personal observations and predictions about the effects of boreal warming by 2050, see 
  Dr Rafael Leal-Arcas 
 
 95
financial limitations that developing countries face, we believe that a way to make this 
system feasible is through alternative environmental technology transfer from developed 
countries to developing countries. 
A Proposal for a Two-Speed Protocol on Climate Change with a Dual 
Timetable 
 
 
 
               Kyoto Protocol                          NEW PROPOSAL: 
                                                            Industrial Nations     Developing Nations  
U.S. Targets                                            
  Year         (percentages)  Year           U.S.  EU     Japan   Year        China     
                                                              (percentages)             (percentages)285
2008/2012 7% 2008/2012 3.5% 4% 3% 2015  1% 
2020 14%* 2020 8% 9% 7% 2025 6% 
2030 21%* 2030 16% 18% 15% 2035 15%
2040 28%* 2040 24% 26% 23% 2045 25% 
2050 35%* 2050 35% 35% 35%   
*Projected cuts 
 
In the chart above, I propose a halving of the emission reductions currently required by 
the Kyoto Protocol for industrialized nations. We realize that this may not be an optimal 
choice from an environmental perspective. However, in light of the stiff U.S. domestic 
political opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, modification of the reduction requirements 
may be the only way to move forward on a global scale. By halving the emissions cuts 
currently required by the Kyoto Protocol for industrialized nations, and by creating a 
timetable of binding reductions for developing nations, we are providing an incentive for 
the U.S. to commit to Kyoto. It is my belief that ratification of a watered-down Kyoto 
Protocol (for the near-term) is preferable to no agreement at all. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Smith, L. The World in 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization’s Northern Future, Dutton, 2010. 
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The percentages required for developed nations are based on the 1990 levels, 
whereas for developing nations, the percentages are based on the 2000 levels. We are 
aware that this would only be possible through technology transfer from developed to 
developing countries. 
This amended Protocol will give more time to tackle the climate change problem 
properly and in a more effective way. As was stated earlier in the article under the 
options that we have under the current situation, we need a longer time-frame since the 
U.S., a leading and major player, is not willing to make the economic sacrifice required 
by the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, there is a need to expand the time-frame (or immediate 
deadline) so that the U.S. is convinced of a feasible means of improving the global 
warming situation. Reducing the level of emissions is a must if the international 
community really wants to find a fair solution to climate change. As it stands now, 
countries are very far from solving the climate change problem. Therefore, there is a 
scientific need to be more demanding if the international community really wants to 
solve, or at least not worsen, the threat of climate change. 
There would be a direct opposition from some NGOs to this proposition, since 
they request immediate action. Other NGOs would agree to see the inclusion of 
developing countries in the fight against climate change.  
6. Greater role of environmental NGOs to shape environmental public opinion. This 
depends very much on what part of the world we are referring to. Some NGOs have 
tremendous access to the media and can, therefore, be more influential. The global 
warming issue should be tackled with a short- and long-term view and with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
285 The percentages for China (and the rest of developing countries) are based on the 2000 levels. 
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international/domestic approach. International enforcement of environmental agreements 
is almost impossible. So a solution could be through domestic enforcement. In other 
words, one should aim at making environmental problem-solving a competence of the 
domestic, and not international, sphere. In fact, public opinion is increasingly taking note 
of the accumulating evidence of global warming. However, global warming is still 
perceived in an abstract way. To make it more concrete, one could raise awareness of 
ways in which climate change will affect people. For example, if there is no action, there 
will be no more snow in the mountains in the near future and therefore, no more skiing in 
ski resorts. It is important that large companies and NGOs continue to raise public 
awareness, which will put pressure on decision-makers to be supportive of environment-
protection policies. NGOs have helped to create an atmosphere of expectations, strong 
feelings and emotions, and have added dynamism to the process. 
7. Give countries credit for maintaining and preserving their forests and for 
reforestation because trees absorb CO2. The U.S. wants to apply this policy, but the 
EU disagrees on the grounds that the U.S. would get away from the Kyoto Protocol 
requirements too easily and the EU would be in an unfavorable position since the EU has 
no more large zones of forests. This system would undermine the whole point of the 
Kyoto Protocol, which is to spur humans into action to control GHG emissions.286 
However, the G.W. Bush administration disagreed with the statement that the whole 
point of the treaty is to spur action by humans to control GHG emissions since it believed 
that the point of the treaty is to reduce global atmospheric concentrations of GHG 
emissions. One way to get there is by reducing emissions. Another way is to increase the 
                                                 
286 Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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sequestrations of GHG emissions by, for example, forests. Focusing solely on emissions 
invites us to overlook an equally important part of the equation, and reducing emissions 
alone won’t solve the problem. There is much that can be done on the side of carbon 
sequestration too. 
8. Find new market mechanisms. The solution should be not only technological but we 
should also look into market mechanisms to find the most cost-effective way to find a 
solution to climate change. The idea is to develop market incentives to make emission 
reductions happen more quickly. 
9. People and ecosystems will need to adapt to future climate regimes. Past and 
current emissions have already changed the Earth’s climate in the 21st century. For 
example, projections for 2100 suggest that temperature in Europe will have risen by 
between 2 to 6.3 degrees Celsius above 1990 levels.287 
Moreover, in 2007 the IPCC conducted several statistical researches to assess the 
uneven change in the climate during the past century. It revealed several trends that are 
likely to be linked to human activity and in particular GHG emissions. These trends can 
be summarized as followed: from 1906 to 2005, the global average temperature rose by 
0.74°C.288 In particular, in that period of time, eleven of the last twelve years (1995-
2005) ranked among the warmest years in the instrumental record of global surface 
temperature (since 1850).289 The rise in temperature seems to be greater in the northern 
areas of the globe.290 In the same way, sea level rose on average at a rate of 1.8mm per 
                                                 
287 European Environment Agency, “Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in Europe,” Report No. 
7/2005, 2006, p. 6. 
288 IPCC, “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report,” p. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
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year between 1961 and 2003, and at a rate of about 3.1mm from 1993 to 2003.291 This is 
connected to a progressive shrinking of snow and ice extent, as demonstrated in the chart 
below:292  
 
 
Source: Polar Science Center, University of Washington 
As shown in the chart below, since 1978, the annual average Arctic sea ice extent 
has decreased by 2.7 per cent per decade, especially in summer.293 Accordingly, 
mountain glaciers and snow cover have declined in both hemispheres.  
                                                 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
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Finally, from 1900 to 2005, precipitation increased significantly in the eastern 
parts of North and South America, northern Europe as well as northern and central Asia, 
whereas precipitation declined in the Sahel, the Mediterranean, southern Africa, and parts 
of South Asia.294 
Adapting to these effects will require a good understanding of socio-economic 
and natural systems, their sensitivity to climate change and their inherent ability to adapt. 
Many strategies are available for adapting to the expected effects of climate change. 
10. Preventive instead of curative approach. Many options for limiting emissions are 
available in the short- and medium-term. What matters is whether the world can work 
                                                 
294 Ibid. 
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out a long-term response to a threat that will gradually rise throughout the coming years. 
The longer it takes to react, the worse the situation gets and the more expensive it 
becomes to repair it.295 Policymakers should, therefore, encourage energy efficiency and 
other climate-friendly trends in both the supply and consumption of energy. Key 
consumers of energy include industries, homes, offices, vehicles, and farms. Efficiency 
can be improved by providing an appropriate economic and regulatory framework for 
consumers and investors. This framework should promote cost-effective actions, the best 
current and future technologies, and “no regrets” solutions that make economic and 
environmental sense, irrespective of climate change. 
Changes in practices and lifestyles, from better urban transport planning to 
personal habits such as turning off the lights, to adjusting the thermostat, to changing air 
conditioning filters, to buying energy-efficient appliances, to weatherizing homes, are 
also important. For example, in the case of the U.S., the chart below shows on the left the 
percentage of households that could be expected to take several steps to save energy, 
based on financial incentives and education campaigns. On the right, the chart shows the 
aggregate potential reduction of GHG emissions resulting from each energy-saving 
measure mentioned on the left side of the chart. This demonstrates that the current level 
of GHG emissions can be reduced significantly by simply changing our lifestyles. 
                                                 
295 The Stern Review on the economics of climate change (2006) provides an economic analysis of the 
disastrous consequences of climate change. Available at http://bit.ly/8lIivV. 
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 Countries should also cooperate with each other and learn from more experienced 
societies in the fight against climate change protection. For example, the Netherlands has 
centuries of experience of protecting themselves against water. They are working out 
how to adapt and build infrastructure to minimize the risks of flooding because of the rise 
of sea levels.296 
11. Reducing uncertainties about climate change, its impacts, and the costs of 
various response options is vital. The prudent response to climate change is to adopt a 
portfolio of actions aimed at controlling emissions, adapting to impacts, and encouraging 
scientific, technological and socio-economic research. 
                                                 
296 “How to Live with Climate Change,” The Economist, 27 November 2010, p. 13. 
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12. Better use of current UN agencies through political commitment. The 
international community should aim at a stronger United Nations Environment Program 
(UNEP) enforcement and providing more authority to the United Nations in order to 
oversee Treaty compliance instead of creating new intergovernmental organizations to 
deal with global warming, such as the World Environment Organization (WEO). 
13. Efficient regulatory mechanisms on energy-consuming products. We should 
promote regulations on air conditioners, for example. The G.W. Bush administration’s 
decision to reduce air conditioner efficiency goals in 2001 was a senseless reversal. 
